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ABSTRACT 
Swine are an important host in influenza virus ecology since they are susceptible to infections with both avian 
and human influenza A viruses. In 2011 and 2012, clusters of human infection with a swine-origin influenza 
A(H3N2) variant virus (H3N2v) containing the matrix (M) gene from the 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus were 
reported in the United States (US). The likelihood of introduction of H3N2v virus into the EU, and subsequent 
exposure and infection of EU pig herds was assessed. The overall likelihood of a pig holding in the EU being 
infected by exposure to H3N2v virus through either imported infectious pigs or humans coming from the US 
was estimated to be low. Efficient separation of imported pigs for 30 days would reduce the likelihood of 
exposure to a negligible level. The likelihood that H3N2v would spread to other pig holdings was judged to be 
high, assuming frequent movements of pigs between holdings. Currently, applied real time RT-PCRs can detect 
all swine influenza A viruses and, combined with gene sequencing, would identify the emergence of H3N2v 
virus. However, sequencing is not done on a routine basis in EU. Experimental studies in pigs show that the 
                                                     
1  On request from the European Commission, Question No EFSA-Q-2012-00912, adopted by written procedure on 
17 September 2013.  
2  Panel members: Edith Authie, Charlotte Berg, Anette Bøtner, Howard Browman, Ilaria Capua, Aline De Koeijer, Klaus 
Depner, Mariano Domingo, Sandra Edwards, Christine Fourichon, Frank Koenen, Simon More, Mohan Raj, Liisa 
Sihvonen, Hans Spoolder, Jan Arend Stegeman, Hans-Hermann Thulke, Ivar Vågsholm, Antonio Velarde, Preben 
Willeberg and Stéphan Zientara. Correspondence: ahaw@efsa.europa.eu 
3 Acknowledgement: EFSA AHAW Panel, ECDC and EMA wish to thank the members of the Working Group on the 
H3N2v mandate: Anette Bøtner, Ian Brown, Marco de Nardi, Christine Fourichon, Olga Munoz, Maurice Pensaert, Gaelle 
Simon and Kristien Van Reeth for the preparatory work on this scientific opinion and EFSA staff: Sandra Correia, Sofie 
Dhollander and Per Have, ECDC staff: Eeva Broberg, Céline Gossner and Angus Nicoll, EMA staff: Nikolaus Križ and 
Manuela Mura, for the support provided to this scientific opinion. Also, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
staff: Susan Trock and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) staff: Joseph Annelli, Patricia Foley, John 
Korslund and Amy Vincent are acknowledged for the support provided to this scientific opinion.  
4  Correspondence: in ECDC: info@ecdc.europa.eu; in EMA: info@ema.europa.eu 
* Minor changes of editorial nature were made. The changes do not affect the contents of this report. To avoid confusion, the 
original version of the opinion has been removed from the website, but is available on request, as is a version showing all 
the changes made. 
                                           Risks posed by the influenza H3N2v 
virus   
EFSA Journal 2013;11(10):3383 2 
infection is purely of respiratory nature and follows a relatively mild course with fever, coughing and 
inappetence, similar to that of the endemic swine influenza viruses. Immunity resulting from vaccination with 
European vaccines may provide some cross-protection against infection with H3N2v virus whereas vaccines 
based on US swine H3N2 strains would offer superior protection. It is not possible to predict which changes 
within H3N2v virus might enable it to develop pandemic properties. Hence, it is not possible at present to set up 
a specific system to monitor such a risk. Nevertheless, it is recommended to reinforce the monitoring of 
influenza strains circulating in pigs in EU. 
© European Food Safety Authority, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, and European 
Medicines Agency, 2013 
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SUMMARY 
Following a request from the European Commission, the Panel on Animal Health and Welfare 
(AHAW) was asked to deliver a scientific opinion on the possible risks posed by the Influenza 
A(H3N2)v virus for animal health and its potential spread and implications for animal and human 
health. 
In 2011, the United States of America reported a cluster of cases of human infection with a swine-
origin influenza A(H3N2) variant virus H3N2v containing the matrix (M) gene from the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic virus (A(H1N1)pdm09). In 2012, 309 influenza H3N2v virus infections in humans were 
identified in the US and 12 cases in 2013. Most of the human infections occurred in persons that had 
contact with live pigs at county fairs, especially children.  
Swine are an important host in influenza virus ecology since they are susceptible to infections with 
both avian and human influenza A viruses and can play a role in interspecies transmission. This can 
lead to co-infection and genetic reassortment of viruses of swine, human or avian origin. Today, 
influenza is a common infection of pigs worldwide, sometimes causing severe respiratory disease in 
non-immune animals. Infection is maintained in endemic cycles without clear seasonality. Currently, 
H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 are the predominant subtypes of swine influenza viruses (SIVs) worldwide, 
but other virus subtypes have also been isolated occasionally from pigs in some parts of the world, e.g. 
H9N2 and H5N1. 
Following the detection of human cases of influenza H3N2v virus, this virus has subsequently been 
detected in pigs in several US states designated H3N2pM virus. With respect to significance for the 
health of pigs of the occurrence of H3N2v virus, if the pig population is completely naïve, it can be 
assumed that the significance of infection with H3N2pM virus will be comparable to infection of a 
naïve population with other swine influenza viruses (SIV), as happened in the past in Europe or US.  
In field infections with H3N2pM in pigs in the USA (agricultural fairs) a subclinical course was very 
common, and when clinical signs were observed (coughing, fever), they were generally mild, with low 
morbidity and no mortality.  
Pathogenicity studies in naive pigs experimentally inoculated with H3N2v show that the infection is 
purely of respiratory nature and shows a relatively mild course with fever, coughing and inappetence 
similar to that of other SIVs currently circulating in the swine population. Thus the impact of 
H3N2pM, if introduced, on the health of the European pigs is not expected to differ significantly from 
the impact of already circulating, endemic SIVs. 
With respect to the risk of introduction of H3N2v in EU, the likelihood of a possible introduction 
of H3N2v virus into EU pig holdings by movement of live pigs according to EU animal health import 
legislations was assessed qualitatively and considered to be low. Moreover, in particular, the 
likelihood of pig holdings in the EU being exposed to H3N2v virus by persons working in the pig 
sector or regularly visiting pig fairs in the USA was judged to be low, whereas the likelihood was 
considered negligible for other persons travelling from the USA. Efficient separation of imported pigs 
for 30 days upon the farmers‘ decision would reduce the likelihood of exposure of EU pigs to a 
negligible level.  
However, given that the a first holding has become infected, the likelihood of spread of H3N2pM from 
pigs of that holding to pigs in a second holding located in the same Member State was expected to be 
high, assuming frequent movement of pigs between holdings and a high likelihood for pigs in a second 
holding to be susceptible.  
With respect to the diagnostic capabilities to early detect H3N2v incursion in EU, early detection 
of H3N2pM/H3N2v in the EU is not likely due to the limited current surveillance effort in 
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combination with routine use of diagnostic approaches which are not able to specifically identify this 
new strain. 
Currently applied real time RT-PCRs based on the matrix (M) or the nucleoprotein (NP) gene are 
capable of detecting all of the influenza A viruses known to be endemic in European pigs plus 
emergent strains such as rH3N2p from North America. However, neither these tests nor real time RT-
PCRs based on H3 or N2 genes are able to specifically identify the H3N2pM as being different from 
European strains. The panel of serological reagents for conventional typing will reliably type all H3N2 
strains and the H3N2pM will raise a different reactivity profile in such assays, due to its antigenic 
differences when compared to European H3N2 SIVs.   
Only by combining currently applied diagnostic approaches with gene sequencing will it be possible to 
identify H3N2pM should it occur in Europe either in pigs or in humans. All of these diagnostic 
approaches are relevant to the timely identification of variant viruses or new strains that may appear in 
European pigs. This combination is not done on a routine basis and there is no official surveillance for 
SIV as this is not a listed disease. It is recommended to reinforce the monitoring of influenza strains 
circulating in pigs in EU. 
With respect to the implications and consequences of the possible evolution of H3N2v virus on 
pig health such as clinical manifestation and transmission between pigs, it is considered likely that 
the H3N2pM virus would have the potential to cause disease, to spread and to become endemic. As 
seen with other SIVs, host selection pressures may drive genetic evolution of the strain, especially in 
the gene segments encoding the external glycoproteins (HA and NA). 
According to the risk assessment developed, given that a first holding has become infected, the 
likelihood of spread of H3N2pM virus to second holdings was expected to be high assuming a 
frequent movement of pigs between holdings of the same Member State, and there is a high likelihood 
for pigs in a second holding to be susceptible.  
With respect to the risk that animals from a herd which was infected with influenza A (H3N2v) 
virus spreads the virus after the last clinical signs of disease have been observed, it is concluded 
that, independent of whether clinical signs are present or not, the virus excretion in individual pigs 
may last up to 7 days post infection. Furthermore, clinical signs, when present, do not entirely cover 
the period of virus excretion.  Consequently, an absence of clinical signs cannot be used as evidence of 
absence of virus excretion. At farm level SIV infections can be maintained with a continuous 
introduction of susceptible pigs. Therefore, the risk of spread from holdings can remain high for an 
extended period of time even after cessation of clinical signs. This takes place particularly when 
susceptible pigs continuously enter the fattening unit. 
With respect to the possibility, efficacy and efficiency of vaccination in pigs, using the existing 
vaccines or newly developed vaccines against influenza A(H3N2v) virus, immunity resulting from 
vaccination with commercially available European SIV vaccines is expected to provide no or only a 
low level of cross-protection against infection with the H3N2pM influenza viruses, whereas vaccines 
based on North American swine H3N2 viruses would offer superior protection. Such vaccines may 
significantly reduce H3N2pM replication in the lungs of vaccinated animals. However, voluntary 
vaccination of pigs with existing vaccines has not succeeded in halting the circulation of SIV in the 
swine population and this limitation is also considered valid for H3N2pM. 
According to the available data, H3N2pM/H3N2v is not present in the European swine population and 
no measures are needed with regard to vaccination. If such a virus should enter Europe and spread in 
the pig population, then use of US licensed vaccines based on closely related H3N2 strains could be 
useful. 
With respect to the use of vaccines in relation to the possible evolution of variants of influenza 
viruses posing a risk to public and animal health, vaccination might increase antigenic drift of 
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circulating influenza strains, and newly appearing variant might not be neutralized by vaccine-induced 
antibodies. However, based on current knowledge there is no indication that the latter has happened 
with the use of the available SIV vaccines in the European pig population. Furthermore, based on the 
likely divergent evolution of H3N2pM in pigs compared to humans, it is unlikely that virus with 
increased transmissibility to humans would evolve.  
With respect to the most important factors to be monitored that would suggest a risk for the  
emergence of a new pandemic influenza strain from the influenza A(H3N2v) virus, the new 
influenza strains emerge through natural reassortment and/or mutations and past experience has shown 
that reassortment events involving inter-species transmission are necessary steps in the evolution of 
new pandemic strains. However, it is not always clear in which species these events occur. Monitoring 
for reassortant viruses should therefore include as important target species both pigs and poultry. 
Several molecular markers in influenza virus genes have been reported to be associated with biological 
properties related to virulence and transmission. However, these associations have been inconsistent 
between strains and virulence traits appear to be polygenic. 
Currently, the number and type of mutations, as well as the genetic constellation that would be needed 
for efficient human-to-human transmission of H3N2v is unknown.  
It is currently not possible to predict which changes (mutations or reassortments) within the H3N2v 
could enable it become a new pandemic influenza virus. Hence it is not possible to set up a system to 
monitor ―the most important factors (…) that would suggest a risk for the emergence of a new 
pandemic influenza strain from the influenza A (H3N2v)‖.  
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BACKGROUND AS PROVIDED BY EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Swine are an important host in influenza virus ecology since they are susceptible to infections with 
both avian and human influenza A viruses and are often involved in interspecies transmission. The 
maintenance of these viruses in pigs and the exchange of viruses between pigs and other species are 
facilitated by certain husbandry practices that have a limited biosecurity level and regular contact with 
humans. This cross species transfer of virus can lead to co-infections involving viruses of swine, 
human or avian origin with subsequent opportunities for genetic reassortment of influenza A viruses; 
as a result a new virus can emerge. Following interspecies transmission to pigs, some influenza viruses 
may be genetically extremely unstable, giving rise to variants able to again breach the species barrier.  
In 2011 the United States of America (US) - International Health Regulation National Focal Point 
reported a cluster of cases of human infection with an influenza A(H3N2) variant virus (H3N2v) 
containing the matrix (M) gene from the 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus (A(H1N1)pdm09). This M gene 
might confer increased transmissibility to and among humans. The same influenza A(H3N2v) virus 
has been detected in swine in several US states.  
In 2012, between August and October, 307
5
 influenza A (H3N2v) infections in humans were identified 
in the US. Ten States reported confirmed human cases. Currently the state of Indiana, with 138 human 
cases, is the most affected. 16 persons were hospitalised and one person with underlying risk factors 
died from the infection. It is reported that most of the human infections occurred in persons that had 
contact with live pigs at county fairs, especially children. Though limited person-to-person spread with 
this virus has occurred, no sustained community spread of influenza A (H3N2v) virus has been 
detected at this time. 
Influenza A viruses of subtype H1N1 and H3N2 have been reported world-wide in pigs, associated 
sometimes with mild clinical disease. At present there is no evidence suggesting that in pigs the 
influenza A (H3N2v) virus behaves in a different way from the other influenza viruses, even though 
influenza viruses are notorious for their unpredictability. What makes this virus of particular concern 
is not only its zoonotic nature but also its zoonotic potential due to the fact that its M gene originates 
from the 2009 H1N1 human pandemic influenza virus strain. In addition, current CDC (US Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention) data indicate that seasonal vaccines formulated in accordance 
with the latest recommendations of the WHO
6
 may only provide limited protection against infection 
with the influenza A (H3N2v) virus among adults and no protection in children.  
A quite comprehensive scientific monitoring programme in pigs is on-going in the EU in the 
framework of research projects such as ESNIP3 (preceded by ESNIP and ESNIP2) and FLUPIG on 
influenza viruses. At present, the influenza A (H3N2v) virus strain currently causing human infections 
in some parts of the United States, has not been detected in EU pig herds or reported from other 
European countries.  
In order to be prepared for a possible emergence and to enable limiting of the spread of the influenza 
A(H3N2v) virus in an effective and proportionate manner, the Commission needs scientific advice and 
a risk assessment concerning the potential spread and the implications for animal and human health of 
this zoonotic virus showing increased pandemic potential. It should further be examined which factors 
may contribute to the emergence of this influenza virus and which of these factors need to be 
monitored.  
  
                                                     
5  CDC, Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, USA: http://www.cdc.gov/flu/swineflu/h3n2v-case-count.htm  
(H3N2v) human case count (as of 05/10/2012).  
6  http://www.who.int/influenza/vaccines/virus/recommendations/2012_13_north/en/index.html 
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TERMS OF REFERENCE AS PROVIDED BY EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
In view of the above, and in accordance with Article 29 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, the 
Commission asks EFSA for a scientific opinion and to specifically assess: 
1. the significance for the health of pigs of the occurrence of influenza A (H3N2v) virus in a naïve pig 
population;  
2. the current situation in the EU as regards the risk of a possible introduction of influenza A (H3N2v) 
virus in particular to EU pig herds and the diagnostic capabilities to early detect an incursion;  
3. the implications and consequences of the possible evolution of the influenza A (H3N2v) virus on 
pig health such as clinical manifestation, transmission between pigs and specifically the risk that 
animals from a herd which was infected with influenza A (H3N2v) virus spreads the virus after the 
last clinical signs of disease have been observed;  
4. the possibility, efficacy and efficiency of vaccination in pigs, using the existing vaccines or newly 
developed vaccines against influenza A(H3N2v) virus, also in relation with the possible evolution of 
variants of influenza viruses posing a risk to public and animal health; 
5. which are the most important factors to be monitored that would suggest a risk for the emergence 
of a new pandemic influenza strain from the influenza A(H3N2v) virus. 
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ASSESSMENT 
1. Introduction and assessment approach 
Infection of pigs with influenza A virus (swine influenza virus, SIV) is common worldwide, often 
causing severe respiratory disease in non-immune animals. Infection is maintained in endemic cycles 
without clear seasonality. Currently, H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 are the predominant subtypes in pigs 
worldwide, but other subtypes have also been found in pigs in some parts of the world, e.g. H9N2 and 
H5N1. 
In Europe, swine H3N2 viruses were occasionally detected in pigs in the early 1970s as a result of 
cross-species transmission from humans to pigs of viruses derived from the 1968 pandemic Hong 
Kong influenza virus. Around 1984, reassortment between the H3N2 viruses and the avian-like 
Eurasian H1N1 virus gave rise to H3N2 viruses with much greater potential to spread in the European 
pig population (de Jong et al., 2007). 
Influenza H3N2 viruses were uncommon in US pigs until 1998, when triple-reassortant (TR) viruses 
containing segments from human seasonal, avian and classical swine H1N1 viruses emerged and 
became endemic in the pig population (Zhou et al., 1999). 
Pigs have long been hypothesised as mixing vessels for influenza A viruses of mammalian and avian 
origin. This hypothesis was corroborated by the emergence of the swine-origin pandemic 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in 2009. A substantial amount of evidence has now accumulated that clearly 
demonstrates that pigs do not constitute a closed environment for influenza viruses but rather a 
platform that supports the persistence of typical swine-adapted viruses while allowing for a dynamic, 
bi-directional exchange of viruses with both avian and other mammalian species that may eventually 
lead to the generation of viruses with increased potential for transmission in pigs and/or humans. 
The approach followed to reply to the five terms of reference (ToRs) had to consider that: 
 The terms of reference cover biologically linked areas (e.g. significance of disease in ToR1 
with implications and consequences from ToR3, the risk of spread in ToR2 with the 
consequences of the possible evolution in ToR3). 
 The general information in this document supports the reply to one or more ToRs. 
 The risk assessment developed to reply to the question in ToR2, ―current situation in the EU 
as regards the risk of a possible introduction of influenza A (H3N2v) virus in particular to EU 
pig herds‖ needs information from several sections of the general information and data. 
 The reader needs a clear understanding from where each of the conclusions and 
recommendations were taken and what is the scientific evidence. 
It was therefore decided to write the general information common to all ToRs at the beginning of this 
document. After the descriptive chapters, the ToRs are addressed in each of their chapters. ToR1, 
ToR3, ToR4 and ToR5 are answered in a descriptive way based on the general information. For ToR2, 
regarding risk of introduction, a qualitative risk assessment has been carried out. The assumptions, 
methodology, risk flow pathways and results are described in a specific chapter (Chapter 10). In order 
to facilitate the link between this general text and the final conclusions and recommendations, a 
summary of the main aspects related to the ToR extracted from each section were highlighted inside 
text boxes included at the end of each descriptive chapter.  
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2. Origin and characterisation of H3N2v virus 
From 1998 until 2009 the majority of H3N2 viruses isolated from swine in the USA contained the 
triple-reassortant internal genes (TRIGs). Multiple distinct lines of TR H3N2 viruses have been 
identified in swine (Richt et al., 2003), suggesting that several introductions of different human 
seasonal H3N2 viruses into swine had taken place. During this period human infections with swine 
H3N2 viruses were only occasionally reported (Cox, 2011). 
Following the pandemic expansion in humans of the A(H1N1)pdm09, this virus has been shown to be 
frequently transferred back to swine worldwide (Nelson et al., 2012a). This has given rise to new 
reassortants between A(H1N1)pdm09 and existing H1N1 and H3N2 swine viruses, including the US 
H3N2v strain that has acquired the M gene from A(H1N1)pdm09. Reassortant A(H1N1)pdm09/H3N2 
viruses were first detected in pigs in 2009 (Dukatez, 2011) and in human cases of influenza as of July 
2011 (Liu et al., 2012a; Nelson et al., 2012b). Reassortants between A(H1N1)pdm09 and swine H3N2 
viruses have also been described from other parts of the world, e.g. Canada (Tremblay et al., 2011), 
China (Fan et al., 2012) and Europe (Starick et al., 2012). 
In the present document, the following nomenclature will be followed to indicate the H3N2 viruses 
under discussion, either when isolated from pigs or when having been transmitted to and isolated from 
humans: 
a) Triple-reassortant (TR) H3N2. Swine influenza viruses originated around 1998 in the USA as 
a result of reassortment between avian, human and swine influenza viruses. These strains 
carry the following gene combination: human HA, NA and PB1; swine NS, NP and M; and 
avian PB2 and PA (see Glossary). 
b) Triple reassortant internal gene (TRIG) cassette. This acronym stands for the internal set of 
genes (PA, PB1, PB2, NP, NS and M) derived from the original TR H3N2 viruses. This 
genetic constellation is found combined with various haemagglutinins (HAs) and 
neuraminidases (NAs), forming TR H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 lineages currently circulating in 
the pig population in the USA.  
c) rH3N2p. This represents all strains isolated from swine and characterised by a genetic 
constellation derived from the enzootic US swine TR H3N2 genetic reassortment events with 
A(H1N1)pdm09 (the number of A(H1N1)pdm09 genes contained in these isolates varies 
according to the genotype). This group includes H3N2pM isolates. 
d) H3N2pM. This represents the US swine TR H3N2 virus which has reassorted with the 
pandemic A(H1N1)pdm09 virus from which only the M gene has been acquired. It represents 
one of the rH3N2p genotypes isolated from swine. The H3N2pM isolates carry seven genes 
from TR H3N2 and only the M gene from A(H1N1)pdm09. 
e) H3N2v. This denotes the porcine H3N2pM virus strain after it has been transmitted from pigs 
to humans and has been isolated from infected humans. The gene segments of A H3N2v are 
thus considered as being the same as of H3N2pM.  
Since 2009, the pandemic M gene (pM) has frequently reassorted with endemic SIVs, both H1N1 and 
H3N2. Nelson et al. (2012b) examined an extensive set of sequence data from swine influenza viruses 
isolated during 2009–2011 and found that the frequency of the pM gene increased significantly during 
this period, being present in approximately half of all H3N2 strains by the end of the period. Over the 
same period a significant increase in the relative frequency of isolation of H3N2 over H1N1 subtypes 
was observed.  
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3. Description of the H3N2v/H3N2pM natural infections in the USA 
Laboratory characterisation showed that the matrix gene was derived from the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus. 
Although this was the first identification of this virus from people in the USA, this virus had 
previously been isolated from pigs in the USA in November 2010 (CDC, 2012a).  
3.1. Influenza virus infection in pigs 
3.1.1. Clinical signs of influenza in pigs in general 
Swine influenza is a disease of the respiratory tract. The onset of disease is typically sudden, and 
general signs include anorexia, inactivity, fever, respiratory distress, coughing, conjunctivitis, nasal 
discharge and weight loss (Olsen et al., 2006). The disease incubation period is between one and three 
days, with rapid recovery beginning five to seven days after onset. Swine influenza is a herd disease 
characterised by high morbidity and generally low mortality rates. However, the H3N2 viruses 
introduced into North American swine herds in the late 1990s initially induced severe disease in the 
naive population, which resulted in abortion and an unusually high mortality rate in mature sows 
(Richt et al., 2003).  
The severity of disease differs depending on the size and density of the population on the farm and the 
age of the pigs. Fattening pigs, particularly when experiencing a first influenza virus infection in the 
second half of the fattening period, may show the most severe signs with fever, inappetence, coughing 
and severe dyspnoea. Secondary bacterial infections can prolong the disease. Morbidity approaches 
100 % and mortality 2–3 %. Recovery follows after four to seven days.  
The virus may persist at the farm level. This takes place particularly when susceptible pigs, often pigs 
with declining maternal immunity, continuously enter the fattening unit. However, there are 
indications that SIVs frequently disappear from farrow-to-finish herds to be reintroduced at a later 
time (Kyriakis et al., 2013). Endemic SIVs may also become part of the multi-aetiological so-called 
porcine respiratory disease complex in feeder pigs (Van Reeth et al., 1996).  
3.1.2. Clinical signs of H3N2pM infection in pigs  
In field infections with H3N2pM in pigs in the USA (agricultural fairs) a subclinical course was very 
common, and when clinical signs were observed (coughing, fever), they were generally mild, with low 
morbidity and no mortality.  
Clinical signs of SIV-associated disease in general are variable and may include anorexia, fever and 
respiratory distress, and the duration of clinical signs, if present, is variable.  
Field infections with H3N2pM in pigs in the USA had a subclinical course with low morbidity and no 
mortality. 
3.1.3. Surveillance in pigs in the USA 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), in cooperation with US administration and 
industry, conducts voluntary surveillance for SIV in the USA. This surveillance is not conducted to 
define prevalence—the goal is to identify viruses that may be circulating in pigs, and gain knowledge 
to contribute to improved animal health diagnostics and vaccines. The agency first identified H3N2pM 
virus isolates collected in late 2010 and have continued to find them across the USA since then. 
USDA‘s SIV Surveillance Program has tested 12 662 samples from 3 766 swine diagnostic laboratory 
submissions collected from October 2010 until July 2012. Over that time period, 1 488 case 
submissions were identified as positive for influenza A infection. Overall, 73 H3N2-positive 
submissions were detected between October 2010 to September 2011 and 138 from October 2011 to 
July 2012. Of the 138 H3N2 cases identified and tested to date, 57 contain the pandemic M gene and 
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were classified as H3N2pM (USDA, online). The USDA SIV Surveillance Program continues to 
collect and test samples to monitor for the type and distribution of all influenza viruses in pigs. 
There is currently no information on the prevalence of endemic swine influenza and A(H1N1)pdm09 
viruses in wild boar. No experimental studies have been performed on the susceptibility of wild boar 
to A(H1N1)pdm09. 
Surveillance in the USA is conducted not to define prevalence but to identify viruses that may be 
circulating in pigs, and gain knowledge to contribute to improved animal health diagnostics and 
vaccines. 
From all samples collected and analysed in the USA between October 2010 and July 2012, there were 
211 H3N2-positive out of 1 488 influenza-positive submissions, and H3N2pM was identified in 57 of 
138 H3N2 isolates tested (41 %) indicating that H3N2pM is quite prevalent among the H3N2 strains 
circulating in the USA. 
3.2. Infection with H3N2v in humans 
Detection of novel influenza A viruses in humans has been notifiable in the USA since 2007 and 
suspected cases are reportable to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Between July 
and December 2011, the CDC confirmed 12 human cases of a novel swine-origin influenza A H3N2 
variant virus (H3N2v) (Nelson, 2012a). 
Infection with swine influenza A viruses has occasionally been detected in humans since the 1950s 
(Myers et al., 2007; Krueger and Gray, 2013). Cases of swine influenza in humans occur after a 
history of exposure to pigs with direct, close or indirect contact (Van Reeth, 2007). Novel influenza 
viruses appearing in humans have to be reported by countries under the World Health Organization 
(WHO) International Health Regulations of 2005. 
In 2012, 309 cases of H3N2v virus were identified. Two of the cases were reported between April and 
July 2012. Both infected individuals were found to have been exposed to swine prior to onset of 
illness. A total of 305 cases of H3N2v were reported between July and September 2012. Two more 
cases were reported in November 2012. 
Exposure data for the cases identified that 273 of the 305 (90 %) had attended an agricultural fair and 
that 73 % (205/279) of those for whom information was available had direct contact with swine prior 
to onset of clinical symptoms (Jhung M, Epperson S, Biggerstaff et al., CDC, personal 
communication). These reports coincided with information from animal health officials that febrile 
illness had been identified among some pigs at one of the first implicated fair events. The preliminary 
results showed that samples collected from some of these ill animals were positive for H3N2pM 
(Bowman et al., 2012). This SIV was found to be similar to virus later isolated from the human cases.  
In the USA, exposure data for the human cases of H3N2v identified that 273 of the 305 (90 %) had 
attended an agricultural fair and that 73 % (205/279) of those for whom information was available had 
direct contact with swine prior to the onset of clinical symptoms. 
The symptoms and severity of H3N2v infection were similar to those of seasonal influenza, with 
frequent reports of fever, cough and fatigue, often in combination. The incubation period was 
approximately two to three days, and in most cases the duration of illness was five days. Sixteen of the 
309 cases were hospitalised; one died (CDC, 2012b). People at high risk include children younger than 
five years, 65 years and older, pregnant women and people with certain long-term health conditions.  
In 2013, 17 influenza H3N2v infections in humans were reported until August 30 in USA. All new 
cases had been in close contact with pigs.  
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The Epidemiology and Prevention Branch in the Influenza Division at CDC collects, compiles and 
analyses information on influenza activity year round in the USA and produces FluView
7
, a weekly 
online influenza surveillance report. The US influenza surveillance system is a collaborative effort 
between CDC and its many partners in state, local and territorial health departments, public health and 
clinical laboratories, vital statistics offices, health care providers, clinics and emergency departments. 
4.  Pathogenesis of influenza virus infections in pigs 
4.1. Pathogenesis of swine influenza in general 
In general, replication of SIV is limited to epithelial cells of the upper and lower respiratory tract of 
pigs—the nasal mucosa, tonsils, trachea and lungs—and virus excretion and transmission occur 
exclusively via the respiratory route. Infectious virus can thus be isolated from the tissues mentioned, 
as well as from bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) fluid, and nasal, tonsillar or oropharyngeal swabs 
(Brown et al., 1993; Heinen et al., 2001; Landolt et al., 2003; Richt et al., 2003; De Vleeschauwer et 
al., 2009; Khatri et al., 2010). In most experimental studies, the virus can be isolated from one day 
post infection (dpi) onwards and becomes undetectable after day 7. SIV has a preference for the lungs 
over the upper respiratory tract (De Vleeschauwer et al., 2009; Khatri et al., 2010). The virus is 
unlikely to spread beyond the respiratory tract and there is generally no detectable viraemia. 
In experimental SIV infection studies, the kinetics of virus replication and nasal virus excretion, as 
well as the viral loads in various parts of the respiratory tract, are dependent upon the inoculation route 
and dose, and so are the severity of lung inflammation and disease. That is, virus can be recovered 
from the nasal mucosa and nasal swabs from day 1 after intranasal inoculation, but only at day 2 or 3 
and at lower titers (De Vleeschauwer et al., 2009). Lung virus titers, in contrast, peak more rapidly and 
are generally higher after intratracheal inoculation. This route reproducibly leads to typical swine flu 
symptoms - tachypnea and dyspnoea with a forced abdominal respiration, fever exceeding 41 °C, 
dullness and loss of appetite (Haesebrouck et al., 1985; Van Reeth et al., 1998, 2002; De 
Vleeschauwer et al., 2009). 
In experimental SIV infection studies, nasal virus excretion becomes undetectable a few days after the 
disappearance of clinical signs. SIV shedding is generally associated with the clinical signs. However, 
clinical signs are often absent or mild and their duration is variable (i.e. until 3 dpi in mild cases and 
5–6 dpi in severe cases) (Van Reeth and Ma, 2012). If other viruses or bacteria cause super-/co-
infection, the duration of clinical signs may be prolonged, without increasing the period of virus 
shedding. In pigs with post-infection immunity from previous exposure to different European SIV 
subtypes (European H3N2 SIV in particular), or in SIV-vaccinated pigs, the duration of virus 
excretion is likely to be shortened (see Chapter 8). 
4.2. Pathogenesis of H3N2v in pigs 
The pathogenesis of the infection with H3N2v in pigs is based on one study carried out with this strain 
(Kitikoon et al., 2012) and is very similar to that upon infection with known SIV strains. Kitikoon et 
al. (2012) examined, in experimentally infected pigs, the pathogenesis and transmission of the novel 
H3N2v isolated from humans and compared different aspects of those induced by two H3N2 isolates 
from pigs collected in 2010–2011. The three viruses were (1) a representative of TR H3N2 SIV, (2) a 
representative of rH3N2p, containing three gene segments from the TR H3N2 (HA, NA, PB2) and five 
genes from the 2009 A(H1N1)pdm09 virus (M, NP, NS, PA, PB1) and (3) an H3N2v virus isolated 
from humans. All isolates induced mild illness with fever, coughing and inappetence, similar to that 
obtained with other SIVs. Lung lesions were most pronounced for TR H3N2, intermediate for rH3N2p 
and least severe for H3N2v. Virus titers were, in BAL and nasal swabs, highest with TR H3N2 and 
lowest with rH3N2p. All three viruses were transmitted in a similar pattern to contact-naive pigs, but 
TR H3N2 exhibited the most efficient transmission. The novel H3N2v virus isolated from a human 
appeared to be the least pathogenic.  
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By analogy with other SIVs and based on the single pathogenesis study with H3N2v in pigs, it can be 
assumed that the virus excretion in individual pigs lasts up to 7 dpi, whether or not they show clinical 
signs (Van Reeth et al., 2006; De Vleeschauer et al., 2009). 
Pathogenicity studies in pigs experimentally inoculated with H3N2v, which has the same gene 
constellation as H3N2pM, show that the infection is purely of respiratory nature and shows a variable 
but relatively mild course with fever, coughing and inappetence similar to that of the endemic SIVs 
currently circulating in the swine populations worldwide. 
By analogy with other SIVs and based on the limited pathogenesis studies with H3N2v in pigs, it can 
be assumed that the virus excretion in individual pigs lasts up to 7 dpi, whether or not they show 
clinical signs.  
Clinical signs are generally associated with viral shedding; however, virus excretion does not entirely 
coincide with presence of clinical signs (may start earlier or last longer than clinical signs). 
Consequently, an absence of clinical signs cannot be used as evidence that pigs are not infectious.  
4.3. Virus distribution in organs and tissues 
Influenza A infection in swine is respiratory with no virus dissemination to muscles or edible organs 
(Vincent, 2009; EFSA, 2010). It is safe to accept that, with regard to food safety, the information for 
the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus also applies to other strains of SIV including H3N2pM. However, low-level 
virus contamination of meat by respiratory secretions from infected pigs may be possible at slaughter 
or processing. If ingested with food, the virus has to overcome several hurdles such as acidic pH in the 
stomach and bile salts in the duodenum, which reduce the infectivity. As oropharyngeal tissues are 
known ports of entry for mammalian influenza viruses, food that passes such tissues, if contaminated 
with influenza virus, could hypothetically transmit a respiratory infection to humans. So far, there is 
no epidemiological evidence that this theoretical possibility has contributed to the zoonotic spread of 
this infection. Normal cooking procedures inactivate the virus in food. Commercially available 
disinfectants used for cleaning of equipment after contact with meat products rapidly destroy influenza 
viruses. Since these statements are generally accepted to apply to SIVs, there is no reason to change 
them for H3N2pM. 
5. Transmission of H3N2pM/H3N2v virus 
5.1. Transmission between pigs (within herds and between herds) 
As described in Chapter 4, transmission of H3N2v from experimentally infected naive pigs to contact 
naive pigs has been demonstrated. In addition, detection of H3N2pM in several farms in the USA 
indicates that the virus has spread between pigs and between herds. 
Infection with H3N2pM in pigs is essentially not different from infection with other SIV subtypes in 
the US and EU swine population. This implies that infection with H3N2pM in swine is respiratory in 
nature and that the route of transmission can be assumed to be mostly, if not exclusively via the 
respiratory route (contact or aerosol). 
5.2. Transmission from pigs to humans 
Early reports in July 2012 associated with the 305 human cases of H3N2v indicated that many affected 
persons had attended agricultural fairs at which pigs were present. These reports coincided with 
information from animal health officials of febrile illness among some pigs at one of the first 
implicated fair events. Preliminary results from samples collected from some of these ill animals were 
positive for H3N2 virus containing the A(H1N1)pdm09 matrix gene (CDC, 2012c). This strain 
(H3N2pM) was found to be identical to virus later isolated from the human cases (H3N2v). Additional 
swine and human sampling associated with a fair in Ohio documented similar findings (Bowman et 
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al., 2012). Of those reporting direct or indirect exposure to pigs (see Section 3.1), 65 % reported 
exposures on multiple days during the seven days prior to illness onset. Ultimately, the investigation 
identified 37 fairs in the nine states associated with the cases, although some cases had attended more 
than one fair. In 2013, 12 influenza H3N2v infections in humans were reported in June in Indiana, 
USA. All new cases had been in close contact with pigs.  
As of 9 October 2013, no influenza H3N2v virus infections have been reported among humans in the 
EU. Novel influenza viruses appearing in humans have to be reported by countries under the WHO 
International Health Regulations of 2005 (WHO, 2005). Infection with swine influenza A viruses have 
occasionally been detected in humans since the 1950s (Myers et al., 2007). There are only five recent 
reports of human infection with swine-origin influenza A infections in Europe (ECDC, 2012c). Cases 
of swine influenza in humans occur after a history of exposure to pigs with direct, close or indirect 
contact (Van Reeth, 2007).  
5.3. Transmission from humans to pigs 
Transmission of influenza A viruses from humans to pigs has been described both for seasonal human 
influenza strains and in particular for the pandemic A(H1N1)pdm09 strain (Nelson et al., 2012a). No 
documented transfers of H3N2v to pigs have been reported, but, given that this strain is a swine-
adapted virus that has been transmitted to humans, back-transmission from humans to pigs must be 
considered possible. 
5.4. Human-to-human transmission  
There has been some evidence of limited (sporadic) person-to-person transmission of H3N2v but none 
for sustained human-to-human transmission. The investigations in 2011 identified two clusters of 
children with probable person-to-person transmission; one cluster of two cases and the second cluster 
of three cases (CDC, 2011a, b). However, in the former instance the second case experienced onset of 
symptoms 10 days after the onset of clinical symptoms in the index case. The investigations in 2012 
identified 15 cases of possible human-to-human transmission, all in children less than 10 years old 
(CDC, 2012c). Fourteen of these cases reported one or more contacts, including contact with swine, 
contact with another ill household member or contact with an extended family member who reported 
influenza-like illness. One case identified an extended family member who had contact with swine, 
although the case did not.  
5.5. Transmission in experimental models 
In ferrets, H3N2v shows the capacity for efficient replication and transmission and these mammals are 
considered good models for how influenza behaves in humans (Pearce et al., 2012). Pearce et al., 
(2012) analysed the virulence and transmissibility in ferrets of four swine-origin influenza H3N2 
viruses isolated from humans: one from 2009, two from 2010 and on from 2011. The isolates obtained 
in 2009 and 2010 were TR H3N2 viruses, while the 2011 isolate was an H3N2v. All four isolates 
replicated to high titres and were transmitted through direct contact. Furthermore, both the 2010 TR 
H3N2 and 2011 H3N2v isolates showed efficient respiratory droplet transmission, comparable to that 
observed with seasonal influenza viruses in ferrets, although only the latter contained the pM segment.  
Although a few cases of human-to-human transmission have been reported, there are no reports of 
sustained human-to-human transmission of influenza H3N2v virus in the USA. Most human cases 
have been associated with direct exposure to pigs.  
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6. Epidemiology of H3N2 influenza viruses in pigs in the EU 
Surveillance data issued by the European Surveillance Network for Influenza in Pigs (ESNIP) since 
2000 have shown that avian-like swine H1N1, human-like reassortant swine H1N2 and human-like 
reassortant swine H3N2 subtypes, as well as A(H1N1)pdm09 since 2009, constitute the dominant 
lineages in Europe (Van Reeth et al., 2008; Kuntz-Simon and Madec, 2009; Kyriakis et al., 2011; 
Kyriakis et al., 2013).  
The human-like swine H3N2 viruses isolated from European pigs some years after the Hong Kong 
pandemic reassorted in 1984 with the avian-like swine H1N1 virus, acquiring six internal protein 
genes from latter strain. This human-like reassortant swine H3N2 has now become the dominant 
genotype of H3N2 virus in European swine populations (Castrucci et al., 1993; de Jong et al., 2007).  
The current virological passive surveillance (targeted to pig farms where acute respiratory symptoms 
were observed) conducted from November 2010 to October 2012 (see Table 1) under ESNIP 3 (FP7-
funded project due to complete 31 October 2013) allowed the detection of 1 533 influenza A virus-
positive farms out of 4 413 farms examined in 13 countries (35 % of farms were positive). A total of 
1 062 viruses have been subtyped, revealing that the H1N1 and H1N2 subtypes are the most prevalent 
viruses. Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses were isolated at an increasing frequency in some countries, 
probably indicating that this subtype has become established in the European pig population. In 
contrast, the H3N2 subtype has been isolated less frequently or not at all in some regions, whereas it 
remains prevalent in other parts of Europe.  
Table 1:  Overview of swine influenza viruses subtyped in 13 European countries from November 
2010 to October 2012—ESNIP 3 consortium 
Country Number of 
subtyped 
viruses 
Influenza A subtypes and lineages within subtypes 
H1N1 H3N2 H1N2 Others 
Avian-like 
swine 
H1N1 
Reassortant 
swine H1N1 
(human-like 
HA) 
pdm-
like 
swine 
H1N1 
Human-
like 
reassorted 
swine 
H3N2 
Human-
like 
reassortant 
swine 
H1N2 
Reassortant 
swine H1N2 
(avian-like 
HA) 
Reassortant 
pdm-like 
swine HxNx 
UK 39 2 ? 27 0 10 ? ? 
Belgium 20 11 ? 0 8 1 ? ? 
Netherlands 30 16 ? 0 7 3 ? ? 
France 185 128 1 5 1 44 6 0 
Italy 121 57 1 6 24 29 4 0 
Denmark 170 44 0 50 0 0 63 10 
Poland 13 11 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Slovakia 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain 19 6 0 0 9 4 0 0 
Germany 443 273 2 15 41 75 7 30 
Finland 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Hungary  16 11 0 2 2 0 0 1 
Greece 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 
Total 1 062 561 4 106 96 167 80 41 
%  52.8 0.4 10.0 9.0 15.7 7.5 3.9 
pdm: A(H1N1)pdm09 
 
Thus, the European pig population has variable immune status to H3N2 viruses. The European swine 
H3N2 viruses are antigenically (by haemagglutination inhibition test - HI) closely related to H3N2 
viruses that circulated in the human population in the early 1970s (see Chapter 8). They have 
undergone a lower rate of evolution than their counterparts in humans and currently show highly 
significant antigenic differences from contemporary human H3N2 viruses, and from H3N2v. 
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Furthermore, levels of specific immunity to the EU H3N2 are likely to be low or even absent in swine 
populations in the regions of Europe where this virus has been absent for some years (see Table 1).  
New reassortant viruses within the three main enzootic SIVs or between SIVs and A(H1N1)pdm09 or 
seasonal human influenza viruses have recently been detected in several countries, with evidence of 
further spread through the swine population for some of them. Co-circulation of enzootic SIVs with 
A(H1N1)pdm09 has resulted in various reassortants that have mainly exchanged HA and/or NA genes 
(Howard et al., 2011; Moreno et al., 2011; Bányai et al., 2012; Starick et al., 2012, 2011).  
Most recently, reassortant viruses very similar to H3N2pM have been isolated from healthy slaughter 
pigs in Korea (Pascua et al. 2013). Both the North American TR H3N2 and A(H1N1)pdm09 have also 
been recovered from pigs in Korea and it is therefore not possible to conclude whether the H3N2pM 
has been generated locally or whether it was brought in by import of live pigs. This study also 
highlights the importance of including healthy pigs in a systematic monitoring. 
 Based on all these experiences with SIVs, it is to be predicted that an H3N2pM virus has a chance to 
persist in the European swine population after entry. However, it remains to be seen if all these 
influenza virus types can co-circulate in a pig population. If H3N2pM becomes endemic, it can be 
expected that, as seen with other SIVs, host selection pressures will drive this strain to evolve whereby 
changes in the gene segments, especially those encoding the external glycoproteins (HA and NA), will 
appear. 
In some European countries or in some geographical areas of some European countries with intensive 
pig production the European H3N2 virus has been circulating at low levels or has been absent in 
recent years. Therefore, the European pig population has variable immune status to European H3N2 
viruses. These above-mentioned areas might have herds which are more susceptible to H3N2pM than 
regions where all three European (H1N1, H3N2, H1N2) SIVs are prevalent. 
In predicting the potential evolution of H3N2pM on the health of the European pig populations, it is 
relevant to make a comparison with similar events that have occurred historically after emergence or 
transmission of influenza viruses (avian H1N1, A(H1N1)pdm09, H3N2, H1N2) in pig populations. It 
has been observed that these influenza viruses, upon adaptation to swine, have become endemic and 
thus persist in the population despite some degree of existing population immunity.  
If H3N2pM is introduced into the European swine populations, it is likely that the virus will be 
maintained in the swine population together with the current endemic European SIVs.  
7. Influenza surveillance and diagnostic capabilities in Europe  
7.1. Surveillance in pigs 
There are no rules for control of influenza in pigs in the EU legislation. However, under the auspices 
of ESNIP 3, guidelines have been prepared to attempt to harmonise SIV surveillance following the 
spread of A(H1N1)pdm09 to pigs in most EU/European Economic Area (EEA) countries 
(www.esnip3.com) 
The level of surveillance programmes varies between EU/EEA countries. However, all countries 
within Europe that test for influenza in pigs use a passive surveillance system based on reporting of 
acute respiratory disease in pigs. Monitoring as defined by Hoinville et al. (2013) of healthy pigs is 
extremely limited. The case identification varies between countries. Sampling for virus detection 
includes numerous specimen types, such as nasal swabs from sick animals or, where 
morbidity/mortality is recorded, tissue sampled from the lungs and/or the upper respiratory tract. 
These samples may also be accompanied by acute and/or convalescent sera to support the virological 
surveillance.  
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In some countries the passive surveillance is organised at a national level, i.e. the UK, France and 
Finland, with private practitioners liaising with specified laboratories over the description and 
identification of cases meeting a set of clinical criteria that will result in the submission of samples. 
Vaccine manufacturers also contribute to the network by enhancing the flow of material from the field 
to the laboratories. 
It is important to remember that not all strains of influenza A virus will necessarily induce clinical 
signs in all production systems. Therefore, the currently applied sampling will probably not give a full 
picture of circulating virus strains. This is relevant when considering the ability to detect early 
incursion of a virus.  
Previous incursions of novel influenza A viruses into pigs probably occurred some years before their 
detection due to the type of surveillance used and the need for virus adaptation before they are 
associated with more severe disease/infection kinetics (Brown, 2000). Some steps towards early 
detection of new strains have been made in Europe by means of the consecutive concerted action 
projects, ESNIP 1, 2 and 3 (ESNIP, 1999, 2006, 2010). Although this network is predominantly based 
on voluntary submission of diagnostic samples, the data collected from the surveillance programmes 
provide a greater understanding of the epidemiology of SIVs at the global level and alert to the 
emergence of new reassortants. However, the project is based on research funding and therefore 
represents only a temporary solution to the long-term need to monitor influenza viruses in animals. 
Surveillance for influenza in pigs within Europe uses a passive surveillance system based on reporting 
of acute respiratory disease in pigs. Monitoring of healthy pigs is extremely limited.  
7.2. Diagnostic capabilities for surveillance of SIVs 
Standardised diagnostic tools have been established for the detection and diagnosis of influenza A 
viruses in pigs through ESNIP 1 and ESNIP 2. Further harmonisation and proof of laboratory test 
standardisation has been conducted in ESNIP 3. Essentially, clinical material submitted from 
virological passive surveillance is screened using PCR technology. Most partners are using standard 
real time RT-PCRs that are capable of detecting all of the influenza A viruses known to be endemic in 
European pigs plus emergent strains such as rH3N2p from North America. These assays are largely 
based on the M or the NP gene, which are highly conserved across these viruses and known to be fit 
for the purpose of detection of endemic SIVs, including A(H1N1)pdm09-like strains, and therefore 
have direct relevance to the detection of H3N2pM/H3N2v (Munch et al., 2001; Slomka et al., 2010; 
Pol et al., 2011). 
Testing algorithms have been developed following initial screening by M or NP gene RT-PCR. 
Several laboratories run RT-PCRs, specific for HA and NA genes, for a rapid molecular subtyping. 
Thus, real-time RT-PCRs have been developed to specifically detect H1 and N1 genes of 
A(H1N1)pdm09 (Hoffman et al., 2010; Slomka et al., 2010; Pol et al., 2011) and conventional 
multiplex RT-PCR assays allow the identification of HA and NA genes of European enzootic strains, 
i.e. avian-like swine H1N1, human-like reassortant swine H1N2 and human-like reassortant swine 
H3N2 (Chiapponi et al., 2012). When combined, these specific RT-PCR molecular tools also allow 
users to rapidly detect reassortant viruses that would have exchanged their HA or NA genes 
(reassortant between endemic strains or between endemic strains and A(H1N1)pdm09).  
Clinical materials are subject to more detailed analyses, primarily through the culture of virus in either 
cells or embryonated fowl‘s eggs. Amplified viruses from these in vitro systems are then characterised 
using a range of tools, including standard typing through haemagglutination inhibition test (HI) using 
panels of sera developed through the various ESNIP programmes over the last 14 years and recently 
reviewed to ensure fitness for purpose and relevance to the accurate identification of virus subtypes 
circulating in European pigs (H1N1, H3N2, H1N2 and A(H1N1)pdm09). Thus, reference panels of 
sera and antigens have been made available to ESNIP 3 partners. Finally, preliminary subtyping using 
                                           Risks posed by the influenza H3N2v 
virus   
EFSA Journal 2013;11(10):3383 20 
these molecular and serological tools is supported through targeted gene sequencing, primarily of the 
HA and NA genes, but also internal gene sequencing, to better understand the potential emergence of 
novel genotypic variance that may be indicative of reassortment between contemporary and/or 
new/novel viruses.  
Within ESNIP 3 a ring trial for M (or NP) gene RT-PCR was organised and has demonstrated that 
most partners participating in surveillance programmes deployed tests that were capable of detecting 
all of the relevant circulating SIV subtypes. Subsequent work done within the network has 
demonstrated that H3N2pM viruses obtained from colleagues in North America are also reliably 
detected with these assays. This is perhaps not surprising given that the H3N2pM virus from North 
America possesses the M gene from the pandemic strain, which was itself acquired from an ancestral 
virus believed to have circulated in Europe. Therefore, the utility of the assays being deployed within 
the ESNIP 3 consortium are demonstrated as being fit for the purpose of detecting H3N2pM virus 
should it occur in European pig herds.  
From in silico analyses, it appears that primers designed to detect H3 and N2 genes from European 
SIVs in multiplex RT-PCR assays should also match with H3 and N2 genes from H3N2pM (and 
rH3N2p), as they were designed in conserved regions from these HA and NA subtypes. Experimental 
demonstration remains to be done, but it can be hypothesised that H3N2pM would be detected as a 
European H3N2 SIV. As genetic lineages within the H3N2 subtype could not be differentiated at this 
analysis step, further H3 and N2 gene sequencing would be necessary to identify H3N2pM amongst 
endemic H3N2 SIVs. Development of molecular tools specific to H3N2pM, especially targeting H3, 
N2 and/or M genes from this strain, would be necessary for rapid discrimination. 
The panel of serological reagents for conventional typing will reliably type H3N2. However, the 
H3N2pM will raise different reactivity profiles in such assays, owing to its antigenic differences when 
compared with European H3N2 SIVs. Currently, the ESNIP 3 network is preparing appropriate 
reagents specific for H3N2pM in order to enhance speed and accuracy of detection. 
Thus, it should be stressed that all these approaches, together with gene sequencing, would identify the 
emergence of H3N2pM should it occur in Europe. Furthermore, all of these diagnostic approaches are 
relevant to the timely and appropriate identification of variant viruses or new strains that may appear 
in European pigs. This potentially includes second-generation reassortants from the endemically co-
circulating strains that also include H3N2, H1N1 and H1N2. 
Currently applied real time RT-PCRs based on the matrix (M) or the nucleoprotein (NP) gene are 
capable of detecting all of the influenza A viruses known to be endemic in European pigs plus 
emergent strains such as rH3N2p from North America. However, neither these tests nor real time RT-
PCR based on H3 or N2 are able to specifically identify the H3N2pM as being different from 
European H3N2 strains. 
The panel of serological reagents for conventional typing will reliably type all H3N2 strains. The 
H3N2pM will exhibit a different reactivity profile in such assays, owing to its antigenic differences 
when compared with European H3N2 SIVs. Specific reagents for detecting H3N2pM are being raised. 
Currently applied diagnostic approaches, together with gene sequencing, will identify the emergence 
of H3N2pM should it occur in Europe either in pigs or in humans. Furthermore, all of these diagnostic 
approaches are relevant to the timely identification of variant viruses or new strains that may appear in 
European pigs. 
A series of EU-funded networks through the ESNIP programme has greatly strengthened and enabled 
harmonisation of approaches for diagnosis of and surveillance for swine influenza. 
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7.3. Influenza surveillance in humans in the EU/EEA countries 
The surveillance of influenza activity in Europe relies on virological and syndromic surveillance 
(influenza-like illness (ILI) and acute respiratory infections (ARIs). The population under surveillance 
consist of patients seeking care in sentinel networks of primary care. The surveillance is not targeted 
to any specific group, such as people in contact with pigs. The human influenza surveillance results 
are reported weekly to The European Surveillance System (TESSy) hosted at the European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). ECDC publishes weekly influenza surveillance overviews 
during the influenza season and fortnightly overviews during the inter-seasons. 
Following the detection of H3N2v in humans infected from pigs in the USA in 2012, ECDC and 
European reference laboratories (the Community Network of Reference Laboratories for human 
influenza in Europe, CNRL) ensured that there was at least the capacity in national reference 
laboratories for human influenza (National Influenza Centres) to readily detect H3N2v should it 
appear in humans in Europe. Although surveillance is in place, it is unlikely to detect sporadic cases 
infected with H3N2v if not presenting with influenza-like illness and notified through a sentinel 
surveillance general practitioner (GP). The surveillance systems in Europe will certainly be able to 
detect outbreaks like those observed in the USA. Enhanced surveillance of humans in close and 
frequent contact with animals would be needed for a more risk-based surveillance. However, this 
might not be feasible at the country level and would need to be reviewed strategically. 
To ensure that novel influenza A infections can be detected in European primary diagnostic and 
influenza reference laboratories, further capacity building will be needed. Based on a survey done in 
2012, the detection capacity of the H3N2v virus as influenza A viruses in the EU/EEA countries is 
good, but the subtyping capability is significantly reduced compared to type A-specific detection 
(ECDC, 2012a). 
The survey indicates that with current capabilities, the variant viruses would be detected as influenza 
A viruses; however some of them would not be subtyped and identified as H3N2v viruses other than 
by sequencing (ECDC, 2012b). 
If a human infection with H3N2v were to be detected in the EU, a vigorous response would be 
triggered, including activation of the laboratory network to increase the national capability for 
detection, distribution of standard and control material, shipment of the variant viruses to the WHO 
Collaborating Centres, etc. For the serological detection of past or present cases, probably the 
appropriate Consortium for the Standardization of Influenza Seroepidemiology (CONSISE; 
http://consise.tghn.org/about/) protocols would be deployed. However, it should be noted that it is 
likely that such infections would be detected with some delay. The epidemiological response would 
include rapid studies to assess the severity, risk factors in humans and transmissibility of the virus at 
an early stage.  
The human population under surveillance consist of patients seeking care in sentinel networks of 
primary care. The surveillance is not targeted to any specific group, such as people in contact with 
pigs.  
ECDC and European reference laboratories (CNRL) ensured that there was at least the capacity in 
National Influenza Centres to readily detect H3N2v should it appear in humans in Europe. Although 
surveillance is in place, it is unlikely to detect sporadic cases infected with H3N2v if not presenting 
with influenza-like illness and notified through a sentinel surveillance general practitioner. 
The survey indicates that, with current capabilities, the variant viruses would be detected as influenza 
A viruses but H3N2v, if present, would not be identified as such by routine diagnostic methods.  
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8. Cross-immunity to North American H3N2 swine influenza viruses in European pigs 
There are no experimental cross-protection studies in which pigs are first inoculated with a European 
H3N2 SIV and then challenged with the H3N2pM virus. Therefore, we can only make assumptions 
about cross-protection based on (1) data about the antigenic and genetic relatedness of these viruses; 
(2) data about serologic cross-reaction between these viruses; and (3) extrapolations from cross-
protection studies with other antigenically distinct H3N2 influenza viruses from pigs. The available 
data regarding these three points are summarised below. 
1) Data about the genetic relationship in the HA and NA of relevant H3N2 viruses are shown in 
Tables 2 and 3 respectively (Kristien Van Reeth, unpublished data). The selected virus strains are 
representative of an endemic European H3N2 SIV, a North American TR H3N2 SIV (cluster IV) 
and an H3N2v virus (similar gene constellation as TR H3N2 SIV, but with pandemic M gene). 
Both the HA and NA of the H3N2v virus are closely related to those of the cluster IV TR H3N2 
SIV, whereas there is relatively low homology between the first two viruses and the European 
H3N2 SIV. 
Table 2:  Comparison of the HA genes of a European H3N2 SIV (sw/Gent/172/08), a North 
American cluster IV TR H3N2 SIV (sw/Ontario/33853/05) and H3N2v (A/Indiana/08/11) 
 sw/Gent/172/08 sw/Ontario/33853/05 A/Indiana/08/11 
nt aa nt aa nt Aa 
sw/Gent/172/08 100* 100     
sw/Ontario/33853/05 85 85 100 100   
A/Indiana/08/11 83 83 97 97 100 100 
 nt, nucleotide; aa, amino acid. * % homology. 
 
Table 3:  Comparison of the NA genes of a European H3N2 SIV (sw/Gent/172/08), a North 
American cluster IV triple reassortant H3N2 SIV (sw/Ontario/33853/05) and H3N2v 
(A/Indiana/08/11) 
 sw/Gent/172/08 sw/Ontario/33853/05 A/Indiana/08/11 
nt aa nt aa nt Aa 
sw/Gent/172/08 100* 100     
sw/Ontario/33853/05 85 86 100 100   
A/Indiana/08/11 84 83 96 96 100 100 
nt, nucleotide; aa, amino acid. * % homology. 
 
2) Table 4 shows the antigenic relationship in cross-HI tests between the three viruses that were 
compared at the genetic level (unpublished data, Kristien Van Reeth). There was minimal cross-
reactivity between the European H3N2 SIV and each of the other two H3N2 viruses. The low 
antigenic cross-reactivity between endemic European H3N2 SIVs on the one hand and H3N2v on 
the other hand has also been confirmed in HI tests with hyperimmune swine sera against the 
European H3N2 SIVs (Table 5). The sera had antibody titres of < 10, 10, 20, 40 or 80 against 
H3N2v, compared with titres of 320–5 120 against the homologous virus. 
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Table 4:  Serological cross-reactivity between H3N2 virus of three different lineages  
 
HI titres with hyperimmune/post-infection serum to 
sw/Gent/172/08 
(S
a
) 
 
sw/Gent/172/08 
(S
b
) 
sw/Ontario/33853/05 
(S
b
) 
 
A/Indiana/08/11 
(F) 
 
sw/Gent/172/08 1 280 320 < 10 10 
sw/Ontario/33853
/05 
20 10 320 40 
A/Indiana/08/11 20 10 40 640 
Sa, swine hyperimmune serum; Sb, swine post-infection serum; F, ferret post-infection sera. 
nd, not determined; sw/Gent, European SIV; sw/Ontario, TR H3N2; A/Indiana, H3N2v  
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Table 5:  HI antibody titers to European H3N2 swine influenza viruses (SIVs) with swine hyperimmune or post-vaccination sera 
Virus HI antibody titer 
Hyperimmune serum Post-vaccination serum 
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H3N2 SIV field isolates 
sw/Gent/1/84 5120 5 120 640 160 5 120 2 560  640 1 280 160 40 
sw/Flanders/1/98 640 2 560 320 160 1 280 1 280  80 320 160 40 
sw/Gent/83/00 640 2 560 320 160 1 280 1 280  160 320 160 40 
sw/Gent/80/01 1 280 2 560 640 320 2 560 2 560  160 320 320 80 
sw/Gent/131/05 1 280 2 560 640 160 2 560 2 560  160 640 320 80 
sw/Gent/172/08 1 280 5 120 640 160 2 560 2 560  160 640 320 80 
sw/Gent/538/10 1 280 5 120 640 320 1 280 1 280  160 320 160 40 
sw/Gent/167/12  640 2 560 320 160 1 280 1 280  80 320 160 40 
            
A/Indiana/08/11* 10 80 10 <10 40 20 1 280 < 10 160 < 10 < 10 
H3N2 vaccine strains 
A/Port Chalmers/73 320 640 80 20 320 160  640 640 20 10 
sw/Belgium/220/92 640 2560 320 160 1 280 1 280  80 320 160 40 
sw/Bakum/1769/03 1 280 5 120 640 160 2 560 2 560  160 320 160 80 
*HI tests against A/Indiana/08/11 were performed with turkey red blood cells instead of chicken red blood cells. 
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3) The Laboratory of Virology at Ghent University has performed a preliminary experiment to 
examine the extent of cross-protection between H3N2 SIVs from Europe and the North American 
TR H3N2 (cluster IV). A group of four conventional, influenza-negative pigs was inoculated 
intranasally with sw/Gent/172/08 at the age of six weeks. Eleven weeks later, the pigs were 
challenged with sw/Ontario/33853/05 by the intranasal route. Table 6 shows the serological results 
at the time of challenge with the North American H3N2 SIV.  
Table 6:  Serological profile 11 weeks after inoculation with sw/Gent/172/08 
Pig no Antibody titers to 
sw/Gent/172/08 sw/Ontario/33853/05 
HI VN NI HI VN NI 
1 80 128 320 10 2 < 10 
2 160 384 640 10 3 < 10 
3 80 128 80 <10 < 2 < 10 
4 80 128 80 20 < 2 < 10 
Geomean 95 168 190 10 2 < 10 
HI: haemagglutination inhibition test; VN: virus neutralisation test; NI: neuraminidase inhibition test 
 
Table 7 shows virus titers in nasal swabs of the individual pigs during the first week post challenge. 
There was no challenge control group in this preliminary study, but TR H3N2 SIV and other SIVs are 
usually detected in nasal secretions from day 1 through to day 5 or 6 post challenge. Although the pigs 
had minimal cross-reactive antibody titers against the challenge virus before challenge, excretion of 
the challenge virus was undetectable in three of the four pigs. 
Table 7:  Nasal virus excretion after challenge with sw/Ontario/33853/05 in pigs with infection 
immunity to sw/Gent/172/08 
Pig no. 
Day post challenge 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 < 1.7* < 1.7 1.7 3.5 1.8 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 
2 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 
3 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 
4 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 
Mean < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 2.1 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 < 1.7 
* Virus titer (log10 TCID50/100 mg) 
 
These data (Kristien Van Reeth, unpublished data) indicate that cross-protection can occur between 
two given influenza viruses with important genetic and antigenic differences in the HA and NA and 
other viral genes, and in the absence of cross-reactive HI antibodies in serum. The immune 
mechanisms mediating this cross-protection remain to be determined, but they will probably include 
mucosal antibodies and cell-mediated immune mechanisms. 
Based on these results, it appears that a single infection with a European H3N2 SIV will not induce 
cross-reactive serum antibodies against H3N2v that can be detected in HI, VN or NI tests. However, 
the data shown in Tables 6 and 7 further support the notion that infection with a European H3N2 SIV 
can, in the absence of detectable cross-reactive antibodies in serum, induce partial cross-protection 
against the North American TR H3N2 SIV and H3N2v. 
It is unlikely that a single infection with a European H3N2 SIV would induce cross-reactive antibodies 
(detectable by HI, VN or NI tests) against TR H3N2 or the closely related H3N2pM. 
Preliminary data, however, support the notion that infection with a European H3N2 SIV may induce 
partial cross-protection against the North American TR H3N2 SIV and H3N2pM, even in the absence 
of detectable cross-reactive antibodies in serum, indicating that cell-mediated immunity or mucosal 
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immunity can also contribute to protection. 
It is expected that a history of previous SIV infection in a herd would reduce the disease impact of an  
infection with H3N2v/H3N2pM. However, because of the antigenic differences between H3N2pM 
and the H3N2 viruses that have been circulating in European pigs since the mid-1980s it is considered 
likely that H3N2pM would have the potential to cause disease and to become endemic in the European 
pig population, 
8.1. Cross-protection against H3N2pM using current European swine influenza vaccines in 
EU pigs 
8.1.1. General information on SIV vaccines 
Commercially available SIV vaccines are inactivated vaccines with an adjuvant. Most vaccines are 
whole virus preparations with an oil-based adjuvant. However, unlike human influenza vaccines, SIV 
vaccines are not standardised for antigenic dose and vaccine strains. In keeping with the antigenic and 
genetic differences between SIVs in Europe and North America, the vaccines for each geographic 
region are produced locally and they contain entirely different strains. Within each continent, the 
vaccine strains may differ among different products; the exact adjuvant formulation and antigen dose 
may also vary. Autogenous vaccines are used in the USA but not in Europe. 
The immune response induced by these killed influenza vaccines is fundamentally different from that 
induced by infection with live influenza virus and it consists mainly of serum antibody to the viral HA. 
In theory, the vaccines should also induce antibodies to the NA, but the NA antibody response to 
human influenza vaccines appears to be inconsistent (Dormitzer et al., 2011) and there are no data for 
SIV vaccines. Unlike an infection with live influenza virus, the vaccines fail to induce mucosal 
antibodies or virus-specific CD8+ T cells and a cytotoxic T lymphocyte response. On the other hand, 
serum HI and VN antibody titers are generally higher after a double vaccination of SIV-naive pigs 
than after infection (reviewed in Van Reeth and Ma, 2012). The antibodies are passively transferred to 
the mucosae of the respiratory tract by transudation, where they can contact and neutralise influenza 
virus. The process of transudation of serum IgG is supposed to be more efficient in the lung than in the 
nasal mucosa (reviewed in Graham and Crowe, 2007). It is therefore believed that killed SIV vaccines 
mainly reduce pulmonary virus replication and the associated disease, whereas reduction of virus 
replication in the upper respiratory tract and prevention of virus transmission are more difficult to 
achieve. In general, post-vaccination HI antibody titers in the serum of individual pigs correlate with 
the reduction in lung virus titers upon intratracheal challenge, provided that HI tests are performed 
against the challenge strain (reviewed in Van Reeth and Ma, 2012). High HI titers may completely 
block virus replication in the lungs, while lower titers reduce lung virus replication sufficiently to 
prevent the typical symptoms, which are highly dependent on the viral load in the lungs. In some SIV 
vaccination-challenge studies (using various challenge methods), nasal virus excretion was also 
reduced (Macklin et al., 1998; Kitikoon et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2007) or blocked (Larsen et al. 2001; 
Kitikoon et al., 2009). Virus transmission to or from vaccinated pigs is not traditionally assessed, but 
one recent study showed a significant reduction of transmission from unvaccinated, challenged pigs to 
pigs vaccinated with a commercial SIV vaccine (Romagosa et al., 2011). 
Table 8 presents an overview of the major commercial SIV vaccines in Europe in 2011. The genetic 
relationship between the HA of the H3N2 strains used in European SIV vaccines and H3N2v is shown 
in Table 9. 
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Table 8:  Commercially available swine influenza virus vaccines in Europe 
Manufacturer 
Product 
name 
Influenza virus strains Adjuvant 
Antigenic content
(d)
 per 
vaccine dose 
Merial Gripovac
(a)
 
A/New Jersey/8/76 (H1N1) 
A/Port Chalmers/1/73 (H3N2) 
Oil 
H1N1: ≥ 1.7 HIU 
H3N2: ≥ 2.2 HIU 
Pfizer Olot Suvaxyn Flu 
sw/Netherlands/25/80 (H1N1) 
A/Port Chalmers/1/73 (H3N2) 
Oil 
H1N1: 4 μg HA 
H3N2: 4 μg HA 
Hipra Gripork 
sw/Olost/84 (H1N1) 
A/Port Chalmers/1/73 (H3N2) 
Oil 
H1N1: 3  10
7
 EID50 
H3N2: 2.5  10
7
 EID50 
Impfstoffwerk 
Dessau-Tornau 
Respiporc 
Flu
(b) 
sw/Belgium/230/92 (H1N1) 
sw/Belgium/220/92 (H3N2) 
Aluminium 
hydroxide -  
oil 
H1N1: ≥ 256 HAU 
H3N2: ≥ 256 HAU 
Impfstoffwerk 
Dessau-Tornau 
Respiporc 
Flu3
(b),(c) 
sw/Haselunne/2617/03 (H1N1) 
sw/Bakum/1769/03 (H3N2) 
sw/Bakum/1832/00 (H1N2) 
Carbomer 
H1N1: ≥ 107 TCID50 
H3N2: ≥ 107 TCID50 
H1N2: ≥ 107 TCID50 
(a) Production stopped in 2010. 
(b) Produced in cell culture; other vaccines are produced in eggs. 
(c) The vaccine is marketed by Merial under the trademark Gripovac 3. 
(d) HIU, haemagglutination inhibiting units as determined by measuring the HI antibody response after administration of the 
vaccine to pigs. 
HAU, haemagglutinating units before inactivation as determined in a haemagglutination assay with chicken red blood cells; 
TCID50, tissue culture infectious dose 50 % before inactivation; EID50, egg infectious dose 50 % before inactivation. 
8.1.2. Protection against H3N2pM viruses using commercially available North American and 
European SIV vaccines 
A study was performed to evaluate the efficacy of the US commercial inactivated SIV vaccines 
against challenge with a swine reassortant virus rH3N2p that contains the A(H1N1)pdm09 matrix 
gene (Loving et al., 2013). The effectiveness was evaluated by the capacity by which vaccinated-
challenged pigs prevented aerosol transmission to naive pigs in an indirect contact model. One vaccine 
provided significant partial protection, as measured by reduction of nasal virus titers in vaccinated as 
compared with non-vaccinated pigs. Two other vaccines provided limited efficacy. None of the 
vaccines was able to prevent transmission of virus to naive pigs in an indirect contact model. Clinical 
signs were not observed either in the vaccinated-challenged pigs or in the unvaccinated controls. It 
was concluded that the vaccines may reduce viral shedding, but none was able to prevent indirect 
transmission of rH3N2p challenge virus to naive pigs. 
Table 16 in Appendix A gives a detailed overview of the major licensed SIV vaccines in the USA in 
2011. The vaccines contain at least one H3N2 strain and one vaccine contains two different H3N2 
strains. The H3N2 vaccine strains belong to the so-called cluster I or cluster IV of the North American 
swine H3N2 lineage. Compared with the European vaccines, the H3 of these vaccine strains and of 
cluster IV strains in particular is much more related to H3N2pM. The H3 of the cluster IV strains 
shows about 97 % amino acid identity with that of the H3N2pM virus. 
Experimental vaccination-challenge studies with European SIV vaccines and H3N2pM virus have so 
far not been performed. Therefore one can only try to estimate the extent of cross-protection based on 
1) serological examinations of pigs vaccinated with European vaccines and 2) extrapolation from 
vaccination-challenge studies with European vaccines and heterologous H3N2 SIVs.  
1) Table 5 shows antibody titers against different H3N2 viruses, including H3N2pM, in serum 
from pigs vaccinated with different European SIV vaccines. Sera were collected two weeks 
after a double vaccination (three- to four-week interval) of conventional influenza negative 
pigs. Only one vaccine, based on Port Chalmers/73 (Suvaxyn Flu), induced cross-reactive HI 
antibodies against H3N2pM. Cross-reactive antibodies were undetectable with the other Port 
Chalmers/73-based commercial vaccine. This demonstrates that the potency of commercial 
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SIV vaccines is determined not only by the vaccine strain, but also by other factors such as the 
adjuvant and antigen amount, which differ between different commercial products. 
2) In challenge studies with European SIVs, several of these commercial vaccines have shown 
the ability to provide protection against H1N1 and H3N2 SIVs isolated over many years and 
with considerable antigenic and genetic drift compared to the vaccine strains. Independent 
studies with Port Chalmers/73-based vaccines showed significant virological protection 
against challenge with H3N2 SIVs isolated in 1984, 1996, 1998, and 2008 (reviewed in Van 
Reeth and Ma, 2012). The challenge viruses were 84–92 % similar to the Port Chalmers strain 
in amino acid sequence of their HA1. As shown in Table 9, the H3N2v virus shows only 79–
83 % identity with the European H3N2 vaccine strains.  
Table 9:  Genetic relationship between the H3N2 strains in European SIV vaccines and H3N2v 
 % identity with H3 of A/Indiana/08/11 
Virus strain Nt aa 
A/Port Chalmers/1/73 86 83 
sw/Belgium/220/92  82 81 
sw/Bakum/IDT1769/2003 82 79 
nt, nucleotide; aa, amino acid. 
 
In summary, the HA of the H3N2pM is genetically and antigenically very distinct from that of H3N2 
viruses strains present in the European SIV vaccines. It is therefore to be expected that the latter 
vaccines will provide suboptimal, if any, protection against H3N2pM. Still, some protection cannot be 
excluded, as demonstrated by the finding that one of the European vaccines based on the Port 
Chalmers strain/73 was able to induce a cross-reactive HI antibody titer of 160 (see Table 5). 
Difference in efficacy between vaccines based on the same strain may be due to aspects at preparation 
such as antigen quantity and type of adjuvant. 
Cross-infection studies with the well-known endemic European H3N2 SIVs indicate that prior 
infection with these viruses may confer some cross-protection against infection with the 
H3N2pM/H3N2v viruses.  
Immunity resulting from vaccination with commercially available European SIV vaccines is expected 
to provide no or only a low level of cross-protection against infection with the H3N2pM influenza 
viruses whereas vaccines based on the North American swine H3N2 viruses would offer superior 
protection. Such vaccines may significantly reduce H3N2 replication in the lungs and disease in the 
individual animal. However, voluntary vaccination of pigs with existing vaccines has not succeeded in 
halting the circulation of SIV in the swine population and this limitation is also considered valid for 
H3N2pM. 
According to the available data, H3N2pM and H3N2v are not present in the European pig population 
and no measures are needed with regard to vaccination.  
8.2. Cross-immunity in humans 
The H3N2v virus differs antigenically from currently circulating H3N2 human viruses, thus seasonal 
influenza vaccines are not expected to provide significant protection. Only modest increases in cross-
reactive antibodies to H3N2v viruses were detected in individuals of any age who received seasonal 
trivalent inactivated vaccine (CDC, 2012; Skowroski et al., 2012). The HA of H3N2v has an amino 
acid homology of 89 % compared with current human seasonal influenza H3N2 vaccine virus 
(A/Perth/16/2009) (Lindstrom et al., 2012). Lina et al. (2011) compared the HA1, which contains all 
HA antigenic sites, of various 2011 human isolates of H3N2v to all human H3N2 vaccine reference 
strains since 1972 to 2011 and a representative swine TR H3N2 isolate from 2010. The group of 
human strains isolated between 1986 and 1998 presented the highest homology to H3N2v, with 
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A/Wuhan/359/95 being the most closely related strain (5.5 % nucleotide divergence, consistent with 
the time of emergence of TR H3N2 in the USA). Human strains isolated before 1983 and after 1999 
had nucleotide divergences ranging from 8 to 11 %, with current human H3N2 vaccine strain 
A/Perth/16/2009 having a 9.3 % nucleotide divergence with H3N2v. Lindstrom et al. (2012) 
evidenced no measurable inhibition to H3N2v by ferret antiserum primed against the current human 
seasonal influenza H3N2 vaccine virus (A/Perth/16/2009). Houser et al. (2013) challenged ferrets, 
previously vaccinated with the 2011–2012 trivalent inactivated influenza vaccine (TIV), with a 2011 
H3N2v human isolate and suggested that this vaccine may provide minimal to no cross-protection 
against H3N2v virus. 
Evidence from serological studies indicates that young children can be expected to have little 
immunity to these H3N2v viruses (CDC, 2012d; Skowronski et al., 2012; Waalen et al., 2012). 
However there is evidence to suggest that young adults, aged 20 to 40 years, may have cross-reactive 
antibodies to H3N2v, most likely due to exposure to human H3N2 viruses that circulated in the early 
to mid-1990s. Middle-aged (> 50 years old) and older adults have lower levels of cross-protective 
antibodies and may therefore be more susceptible.  
8.3. Influence of H3N2 naivety or immune status in the European swine population related 
to possible H3N2pM entry 
The level of immunity to H3N2 virus in European pigs varies across regions and the following three 
scenarios are the most likely, based on the current geographical prevalence of SIVs: 
1) A totally SIV-naive pig population that has not been infected with any of the European SIVs 
circulating in pigs in Europe. 
It is expected that the introduction of H3N2pM would cause a typical clinical picture as has been 
observed when the European pig population was for the first time confronted in 1979 with the H1N1 
avian-like influenza virus or in the mid-1980s with the human Port Chalmers/73-like H3N2 
reassortant. In this case, influenza symptoms are observed, characterised by an acute and a rapidly 
spreading respiratory disease, high fever, anorexia, inactivity, tachypnea, dyspnea and coughing.  
2) An H3N2-naive pig population which has not been infected with the European H3N2 subtype but 
which has been infected with the other endemic SIV subtypes (H1N1 and/or A(H1N1)pdm09 
and/or H1N2). The European H3N2 subtype is presently not detected in some Member States or in 
regions within some Member States (see Table 1 from ESNIP 3). 
It is to be expected, in such cases, that a limited cross-protection might be observed despite the 
absence of HI or VN antibodies to H3N2. Limited cross-protection has previously been documented 
between European H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 viruses (Heinen et al., 2001; Van Reeth et al., 2003, 2006; 
reviewed in Van Reeth and Ma, 2012)  
If the H3N2pM were to enter such pig populations, the clinical disease would be expected to be milder 
than that described above for naive pigs, with less virus being produced in the respiratory tract, and for 
a shorter time.  
3) A pig population which is immune after infection with all SIVs (H3N2 virus included) 
endemically present in Europe and/or a population which has been vaccinated with European 
vaccines.  
If H3N2pM were to enter such a population, infection immunity would be expected to provide a 
certain but variable and unreliable degree of cross-protection. Earlier studies (reviewed in Van Reeth 
and Ma, 2012) and data presented in Table 7 confirm that, in the absence of cross-reactive HI 
antibodies in serum, cross-protection can occur between the US TR H3N2 and the EU H3N2 influenza 
viruses, despite substantial genetic and antigenic differences in the HA and NA and in other viral 
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genes. However, no challenge experiments have been performed to evaluate the degree of cross-
protection against H3N2pM. On the other hand, when only vaccination immunity induced by 
European SIV vaccines is present, and thus in the absence of infection immunity, no or only a very 
low level of cross-protection against H3N2pM is to be expected. 
In this scenario 3, with European H3N2 infection immunity, it is to be anticipated that the H3N2pM in 
the European swine population will cause infections with possible reduced virus replication in the 
respiratory tract and mild to subclinical respiratory disease with some fever, variable morbidity and no 
mortality.  
It should also be stressed that the level and effectiveness of cross-protection is expected to be very 
variable from one country to the other and from one farm to the other depending on the prevalence of 
SIV infections, the subtypes/lineages involved and the frequency of reinfections. 
Upon entry of H3N2pM into Europe, scenario 1 (no immunity to any of the SIVs) would lead to a 
typical influenza outbreak; scenario 2 (immunity only to SIV subtypes other than H3N2) would be 
anticipated to afford very limited cross-protection; and scenario 3 (immunity to one or more SIVs 
including H3N2 and/or immunity after vaccination) would be expected to provide a significant but 
varying degree of cross-protection.   
Because of the antigenic differences between H3N2pM and the H3N2 viruses that have been 
circulating in European pigs since the mid-1980s, it is considered likely that, should H3N2pM enter 
the European pig population, it would have the potential to cause disease, to spread and to become 
endemic. 
9. Emergence of a new pandemic strain from H3N2v 
A large array of viral, host and environmental factors influence intra- and inter-species transmission of 
influenza viruses. HA receptor-binding specificity, in conjunction with cellular receptor expression, 
influences host and tissue tropism (upper respiratory versus intestinal tract). However, other structural 
and non-structural proteins involved in replication and transcription of the viral genome also affect the 
host range, level of viral replication, temperature permissiveness and excreted titre (Neumann and 
Kawaoka, 2006; Yassine et al., 2010). Transmission and establishment of an infection in a population 
can also be influenced by the prevailing specific immunity of the population. 
Following the establishment of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in domestic pigs worldwide (originating from an 
as yet unidentified source), a significant number of A(H1N1)pdm09 and enzootic swine influenza 
reassortants (involving both H1 and H3 subtypes) has been described over the last three years in the 
USA (Ducatez et al., 2011; Kitikoon et al., 2012; Nelson et al., 2012b), Canada (Tremblay et al., 
2011), Europe (Starick et al., 2012) and Asia (Fan et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2012a). H3N2pM is one 
example of a reassortant that has become established in US swine herds. This strain carries seven 
genes originating from TR H3N2 SIVs and the M gene from A(H1N1)pdm09, which originally 
derives from the Eurasian swine lineage (Garten et al., 2009). Thus, the presence of A(H1N1)pdm09 
in pigs constitutes a public health risk for the emergence of new influenza strains with pandemic 
potential (Chou et al., 2011). This strain is able to provide one or more genes to new reassortants that 
might increase transmissibility to humans of any subtype occurring in pigs, including H1, H3, H5 or 
H9 (Vijaykrishna et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2012). 
At present, two simultaneous and collaborating projects are developing risk assessment 
framework/tools for ranking influenza A viruses circulating in animals; namely the influenza risk 
assessment framework (IRAF) within the EFSA-funded project FLURISK and the CDC influenza risk 
assessment tool (IRAT). Data on epidemiological and virological risk factors are being gathered 
(through literature reviews and expert knowledge) to contribute to developing these evidence-based 
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tools. Components of these under-development assessments are presented in this document to 
contribute to the response to ToR5. 
9.1.  Inter-species transmission 
Influenza A viruses infect a large variety of species, including humans, wild and domestic birds, pigs, 
horses, seals, whales, cats, ferrets, dogs and mink. Generally, each strain shows a certain level of 
restriction to the host species in which it is circulating (Neumann and Kawaoka, 2006).  Inter-species 
transmission occurs readily among avian species and, more seldom, from the avian to the mammalian 
host. 
In order for a virus to transmit from an animal to humans, it has to be able to attach, replicate, 
counteract the host immune response and efficiently exit this new host. And in order to spread from 
human to human it has to be airborne. Each of these steps depends on polygenic interactions. 
Therefore, adaptation to a new host species usually requires a series of genetic adaptations to become 
successful, and these adaptations are the result of accumulating genetic changes (mutations and/or 
reassortment) that represent a complex polygenic viral trait (Forrest and Webster, 2010; Yassine et al., 
2010), which may take several years to occur (Smith et al., 2009). 
Most of the studies on influenza A adaptation to other species than their natural reservoir have been 
focused on the avian-to-human species jump and the mutations and reassortment deemed necessary for 
this event. Notwithstanding the probable emergence of A(H1N1)pdm09 from pigs, very few published 
studies are found regarding adaptation of swine viruses to humans, and data in this field of study are 
scarce. It is important to highlight, nonetheless, that human and swine influenzas share some common 
molecular markers (i.e. similar mutations arise in avian strains when replicating in swine and humans, 
e.g. HA mutations in the receptor-binding site (RBS), mutations in PB2). 
It is important to highlight that SIVs of different subtypes have been isolated not only from humans, 
but also from mink, waterfowl and turkeys. Proximity between farms or presence of other animals 
than swine (e.g. turkeys) in the farm have been theorised on several occasions to be the reason for the  
inter-species transmission, but no risk factors have been quantified (e.g. Olsen et al., 2003; Yassine et 
al., 2007; Gagnon et al., 2009; Tremblay et al., 2011). Few case–control studies, conducted either in 
Europe or in the USA, have been carried out to elucidate risk factors associated with SIV transmission 
to humans and occupational exposure has repeatedly been identified as a risk factor (Olsen et al., 
2002; Myers et al., 2006; Gerloff et al., 2009). So far, H3N2pM viruses have been isolated only from 
humans and the virological mechanisms behind this event or potential human-to-human transmission 
in the future are currently unknown. 
The CDC influenza risk assessment tool (IRAT) and the influenza risk assessment framework (IRAF) 
within the EFSA-funded project FLURISK take into account a range of virological characteristics as 
risk elements which are described below. 
9.2. Cellular receptors 
Influenza A viruses bind through the viral HA to N-acetylneuraminic acid, a type of sialic acid (SA) 
found on the glycan chains of host cellular receptors. Differential binding is observed depending on 
whether the SA is linked through the hydroxyl group of carbon-3 (α2–3) or carbon-6 (α2–6) of the last 
galactose on the glycan chain. Avian and equine viruses preferentially bind to receptors having the 
α2–3 glycosidic linkage, whereas swine and human viruses preferentially bind to receptors with α2–6 
linkage (Connor et al., 1994; Matrosovich et al., 1997). Mutations in or near the RBS of the virus may 
change their binding preference. Similar RBS mutations that shift receptor preference from α2–3 SAs 
towards α2–6 SAs are seen in human and swine strains, as both species present similar receptor 
distribution, α2–6 SAs being the predominant type in their upper respiratory tract. It has been 
suggested that an increase and/or shift in receptor preference towards α2–6 SAs is a prerequisite for 
human-to-human transmission (Matrosovich et al., 2000). Other receptor characteristics can influence 
binding affinity, such as the glycan species linked to the SA and glycan topology. The HA segment in 
                                                                                                 Risks posed by the influenza H3N2v 
H3N2v   
EFSA Journal 2013;11(10):3383 32 
TR SIVs and thus in H3N2pM/v circulating in the USA derives from a human seasonal H3N2 virus 
and has retained the amino acid motif which confers α2–6 SA receptor preference, typically found in 
human seasonal strains (Pearce et al., 2012). Currently it is not known if the HA of SIV lineages needs 
further modifications to attach efficiently to human receptors. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight 
that several in vitro studies have evidenced similar attachment patterns to synthetic receptors between 
SIVs and seasonal human influenza viruses (both H1 and H3 subtype) (Bateman et al., 2010; Chen et 
al., 2011; Pearce et al., 2012). 
9.3. Replication and release 
Following binding of influenza virus to the host cell SA receptor, the virion is internalised in an 
endocytic vesicle and, as a result of several conformational modifications the ribonucleoprotein 
complex (RNP, i.e. viral RNA segments coated with the nucleoprotein (NP) and the RNA-dependent 
RNA polymerase: PB1, PB2 and PA; Bouvier and Palese, 2008), is released into the cytoplasm. 
Viruses rely on the host‘s intracellular machinery for replication, and the viral RNP requires adaption 
to numerous intracellular factors (Moncorgé et al., 2010). 
Like most swine and human strains, TR H3N2, including H3N2pM, carries mutations in the PB2 gene 
that are important for mammalian replication (Liu et al., 2012b). It is currently not known how, and if, 
swine strains need further mutations to gain overall efficient replication in humans. 
Progeny virions assemble and bud at the plasma membrane (Neumann et al., 2009). The NA 
contributes to the release of progeny virus from the host cell and prevents viral particle aggregation 
(Bouvier and Palese, 2008). The released viral progeny can then infect neighbouring cells or exit the 
host to infect a new organism. NA‘s functions are correlated with HA, and its substrate preference is 
in accordance with HA binding preference. Kobasa et al. (1999) identified a residue in the NA of N2 
human and European swine subtypes that increases preference towards α2–6 SA without affecting α2–
3 activity. As the NA in TR SIVs originates from a seasonal human influenza virus, and this residue is 
conserved in circulating H3N2 SIVs, including H3N2pM, it is reasonable to suggest that it serves the 
same function in H3N2v/H3N2pM. Nonetheless, the relative importance of this mutation in species 
jump is still to be ascertained. 
Virological characteristics governing airborne transmissibility are so far largely unknown. It has 
recently been proposed that the presence of the M gene from the Eurasian swine H1N1 lineage is 
possibly associated with the airborne transmission of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus (Chou et al., 2011). 
Additionally, both NA and M Eurasian genes may contribute to transmissibility and release of these 
viruses (Lakdawala et al., 2012). Point mutating the A(H1N1)pdm09 M gene to residues found in 
Eurasian and/or American TR swine lineages reduced plaque size, growth rate and overall virus 
replication (Bialas et al., 2012). On the other hand, an in vivo transmission study in ferrets infected 
with H3N2 strains isolated from human cases of swine influenza did not evidence a transmission 
ability difference between a human H3N2 isolate carrying the M gene of A(H1N1)pdm09 and two 
other H3N2 human isolates bearing a TR swine lineage M gene (see study by Pearce et al. (2012) in 
Section 5.4). Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain the role of the A(H1N1)pdm09-M gene within the 
H3N2v genetic background. 
HA, PB2 and NA and M mutations, mentioned throughout these sections, have not been studied in an 
H3N2v/pM genetic background; thus, their possible effect on the phenotype of these strains, as well as 
their possible contribution to potential human-to-human transmission, is currently unknown. 
Nevertheless, an H3N2v isolate has been shown to be able to replicate efficiently in human cells in 
vitro and in ferrets in vivo, and to be transmitted through respiratory droplets to naive ferrets (Pearce et 
al., 2012). Further work, using a broader spectrum of H3N2v, H3N2pM and TR H3N2 isolates, is 
needed to clarify the transmission phenotype of this strain (both using naive ferrets and ferrets primed 
against human H3N2 seasonal strains).  
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In addition, all of these molecular markers (or similar) are found in all swine strains, except for the 
A(H1N1)pdm09-M gene, which is found only in rH3N2p viruses circulating in swine in the USA (and 
in a subset of isolates in Europe and Asia). Therefore, it is currently unknown what makes H3N2pM 
more prone to jump to humans than other rH3N2p or TR H3N2 strains. It is not possible to state which 
modifications (in terms of further reassortment and/or mutations) this strain needs for acquiring 
human-to-human transmission (owing to the intricacy of the issue and scientific data paucity) and 
whether its evolution will ever lead to such an event.  
It is currently unknown if H3N2v (and SIVs in general) is able to modulate the human innate immune 
response as efficiently as a human seasonal strain. Regarding adaptive immune response, as already 
described in Chapter 8 (Section 8.4), there is an age-related presence of cross-protective antibodies 
against H3N2v in the human population, with children < 10 years old being most susceptible and, to a 
lesser extent, adults > 50 years old. Less vulnerable are people aged 20–40 years (CDC, 2012d; 
Skowronski et al., 2012; Waalen et al., 2012). Therefore, this may represent a barrier to the human-to-
human transmission of this virus. 
9.4. Animal models for human disease 
At present, detailed studies of the relevance of the various molecular markers to pathogenesis and 
transmission in influenza virus can be undertaken only in animal models. As a model for influenza in 
man, the ferret is regarded as the most appropriate because (1) it is naturally susceptible to all strains 
of influenza virus without the need for prior adaptation, (2) clinical signs and illness parallel those 
which are produced in humans infected with the same strains and (3) the distribution of receptor types 
in the respiratory tract is similar to that in humans (i.e. predominance of α2–6 receptors in the upper 
tract and both α2–3 and α2–6 receptors in the lower tract). As already described in Section 5.4 and 
referred to in Section 9.3, an in vivo study in ferrets evidenced both TR H3N2 and H3N2v human 
isolates as capable of respiratory transmission between ferrets. This does not reflect exactly what has 
been seen in the field at the animal–human interface and highlights that aerosol transmission is a 
polygenic trait and the complexity of studying influenza transmission in the laboratory.  
9.5. Significance of molecular markers 
A large number of mutations and molecular markers of the influenza virus genes have been linked to 
various properties of the virus, such as receptor binding, host and tissue tropism, virulence, modulation 
of the host immune response, and efficiency of replication and transmission (Reperant et al., 2012). In 
most cases, however, the phenotypic manifestation of particular characteristics is polygenic and does 
not rely on single mutations. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that a specific mutation will have 
exactly the same phenotypic consequence regardless of the genetic make-up of the strain within which 
it is found or that the same mutation will be essential in each and every transmission event (e.g. it was 
commonly believed that the PB2-627K mutation was a fundamental marker of mammalian adaptation 
and the emergence of A(H1N1)pdm09, carrying other mutations in the PB2 than 627, demonstrated 
the unpredictability of these viruses and the difficulty of applying molecular markers as paradigms to a 
broad influenza spectrum). Although some human-adaptive signature amino acids can be found in 
H3N2v (see previous paragraphs for reference), as has been formerly highlighted, the phenotypic 
consequences of these genetic markers have been studied in genetic backgrounds other than H3N2v 
and we cannot be certain that these mutations will have the same effect on this strain. Neither can it be 
assumed that the emergence of mutations not yet seen in H3N2v and which have been recognised as 
important for human adaptation in other zoonotic strains (e.g. PB2-627K) will be of any significance 
for the emergence of a pandemic virus from H3N2v. 
9.6. Reassortment 
Since the genome of influenza A consists of eight separate RNA molecules (the genome segments), 
mixed infection by two viral strains within the same cell can lead to reassortment. The rules that 
govern reassortment dynamics are largely unknown. The emergence and characteristics of progeny 
viruses are unpredictable and may therefore contain previously unknown genetic profiles. 
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Viruses possessing the triple reassortant internal gene (TRIG) cassette with several combinations of 
surface proteins (H1, H3, N1, N2) have been circulating in swine in the USA since 1998, and their 
emergence led to an end to the 80 years of predominance of classical swine H1N1 virus circulation. 
This has led Ma et al. (2009) and Kimble et al. (2011) to suggest that this genomic combination allows 
for easy surface protein reassortment and may endow an infection/transmission advantage on swine 
viruses possessing the TRIG cassette. H3N2v possess all TRIG except for the M gene, which derives 
from A(H1N1)pdm09. The role of the A(H1N1)pdm09-M gene within the H3N2v/pM genetic 
background and of potential further reassortment is currently not known. 
New influenza virus strains emerge through natural genetic reassortment and/or mutations. 
Past experience has shown that reassortment events involving inter-species transmission are necessary 
steps in the evolution of new pandemic strains. Studies in animal models have shown that the 
correlation between the molecular markers and biological properties is not absolute. Virulence and 
pathogenesis are not the properties of a single gene or protein. They are polygenic and the specific 
gene constellation is also important.  
Currently, the number and type of mutations, as well as the genetic constellation needed for efficient 
human-to-human transmission, are unknown. Consequently, no single genetic marker or genetic 
constellation can be reliably associated with increased pathogenicity or transmissibility of influenza 
virus strains in humans.  
10. Risk of introduction of H3N2v/H3N3pM in EU 
EU legislation on imports from third countries of ungulates including breeding pigs is laid down in 
Regulation (EU) No 206/2010.
8
 The USA was not included in the list of third countries from where 
imports of breeding pigs into the EU may be authorised until a recent amendment of the import rules 
by Regulation 102/2013.
9
 This amendment introduced specific provisions in relation to vesicular 
stomatitis, which include a pre-export quarantine of pigs intended for export of at least 30 days in a 
quarantine station, during which time the pigs must be tested for that disease. The USA was thus 
included in 2013 in the list of third countries from where imports can take place provided the 
supplementary guarantees for vesicular stomatitis are fulfilled. 
In addition, after importation the animals must be conveyed without delay to the holding of 
destination, where they shall remain for a minimum period of 30 days before further movement 
outside the holding, except in the case of animal dispatched directly to the slaughterhouse or of 
animals transiting the EU en route from one third country to another third country. However, in case 
pigs are moved to another Member State official animal health examination and certification before 
dispatch is required. 
There are no legal requirements determining if, during this 30-day period or part thereof, imported 
pigs must be kept separate from pigs already present on the holding of destination.  
ToR2 concerns the following questions: What is ―the current situation in the EU as regards the risk of 
a possible introduction of influenza A (H3N2v) virus in particular to EU pig herds and the diagnostic 
capabilities to early detect an incursion?‖. The question on risk of introduction was split into two parts 
and the risk is understood as likelihood and does not include consequences: 
                                                     
8 Commission Regulation (EU) No 206/2010 of 12 March 2010 laying down lists of third countries, territories or parts 
thereof authorised for the introduction into the European Union of certain animals and fresh meat and the veterinary 
certification requirements. OJ L 73, 20.3.2010, p. 1-121.  
9  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 102/2013 of 4 February 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 206/2010 as 
regards the entry for the United States in the list of third countries, territories or parts thereof authorised for the 
introduction of live ungulates into the Union, the model veterinary certificate ‗POR-X‘ and the protocols for testing for 
vesicular stomatitis. OJ L 34, 5.2.2013, p. 4-11.  
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Part 1: What is the likelihood of viable H3N2v (humans) or H3N2pM (pigs) virus entering the EU, 
followed by exposure and infection of the first pig holding? 
Part 2: What is the likelihood of H3N2pM (pigs) virus spreading through the movement of infected 
pigs from the first infected holding followed by exposure and infection of the second holding? 
The consecutive events that may lead to the infection of a first holding (Part 1) and spread to a second 
holding (Part 2) in the EU are combined into two risk pathways (Section 10.2), the first for two 
scenarios, after taking into account several assumptions (Section 10.1.1).  
10.1. Methodology 
Owing to data gaps and the fact that some events in the risk pathway are hypothetical, since the import 
of breeding pigs is only newly implemented, it was decided to use a qualitative risk assessment 
approach. Qualitative approaches for risk assessment have proved useful for many examples of animal 
health-related questions (EFSA, 2011, 2013) and provide a useful tool for risk managers to identify 
ways to mitigate the risk and to communicate their decisions.  
10.1.1. Assumptions 
The following assumptions were made while developing this risk assessment: 
 It is expected that only a limited number of breeding pigs will be imported, as they are 
primarily imported for genetic improvement. These breeding pigs are moving from holdings 
in the USA that are usually of a high biosecurity standard to pig breeding holdings in the EU 
of comparable biosecurity standard. From these holdings, after having remained at the holding 
of destination for a minimum period of 30 days, imported pigs can be moved to pig holdings 
of any biosecurity level. 
 It is assumed that both infectious humans and infectious pigs would be moved from the USA 
by aeroplane, and the entire duration of the journey was expected to take only one or two 
days. Infectious humans can possibly infect pigs in holdings with a high biosecurity level, or 
pigs in holdings with a lower level of biosecurity, including free-range holdings.  
 There is no exposure posed by pig products (no viraemia), semen, wild boar or migratory 
birds.  
 The likelihood of introduction of the virus into the EU through illegal import of live breeding 
pigs cannot be excluded a priori (even though we can reasonably assume it to be highly 
unlikely), but there is no information available and therefore this path is not included in the 
risk assessment pathway. 
 Surveillance for detection of infectious humans at the airport checks is not feasible (according 
to ECDC) and therefore this event was not included in the risk assessment pathway. 
 Although a few cases of human-to-human transmission have been reported, no sustained 
human to human transmission has been observed (see Section 5.4). Therefore, amplification of 
the infection among humans was not considered in the model. 
 Humans travel directly from the USA to the EU without intermediate stops.  
10.1.2. Model input parameters 
The likelihood that the several events in the risk pathway will occur is known to depend on multiple 
risk factors. The estimates of these likelihoods were initially assessed by considering available 
relevant published data or information. Whenever there were no published data or information, those 
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likelihoods were estimated based on experts‘ opinion. Experts were asked to give likelihood estimates 
for the events in the risk pathway, in response to specific questions, as presented in Table 17 in 
Appendix B, according to the categories presented in Table 10. Then, the final estimate of the 
likelihood of each event was based on the consensus value agreed between the Working Group 
members. These likelihood estimates are indicated in Table 17 in Appendix B and also in the risk 
pathway presented in Figures 1, 2 and 3, inside the pink boxes ( ).  
Table 10:  Definition of likelihood categories 
Likelihood 
category 
Interpretation  
Negligible (N) Probability of event sufficiently low to be ignored or event only possible in exceptional 
circumstances  
Low (L) Occurrence of event is a possibility in rare cases 
Moderate (M) Occurrence of event is a possibility  
High (H) Occurrence of event is clearly a possibility  
 
Besides estimating the likelihoods for each event to happen, the uncertainty associated with the 
estimate considered was given to prevent misinterpretation and over-confidence in the outcomes of the 
risk assessment and to highlight areas with poor data quality or disagreement between experts. 
Definitions of these uncertainty categories are presented in Table 11. These uncertainty values are 
indicated in Table 17 in Appendix B and also in the risk pathway presented in Figures 1, 2 and 3, 
inside the blue boxes in the risk pathway presented in Figures 1 and 2 ( ).  
Table 11:  Definition of uncertainty categories 
Uncertainty 
category  
Interpretation  
Low (L) Solid and complete data available; strong evidence provided in multiple references; authors 
report similar conclusions  
Medium (M) Some but no complete data available; evidence provided in small number of references; 
authors report conclusions that vary from one another  
High (H) Scarce or no data available; evidence is provided not in references but rather in unpublished 
reports, based on observations, or personal communication; authors report conclusions that 
vary considerably between them  
10.1.3. Combination of likelihood estimates 
The risk model formalises the combination of likelihood estimates downstream through the events of 
the risk pathway (hierarchical model). To construct the general model, three components were 
defined: 
 deriving total likelihood estimates of events influenced by multiple independent horizontally 
related events in the pathway (horizontally related events indicate that these events may 
happen at the same time); 
 combining likelihood estimates of dependent vertically related events in the pathway 
(vertically related events indicate that the events happen chronologically subsequent of each 
other); 
H
L 
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 combining likelihood estimates of non-dependent vertically related events in the pathway.  
A combination matrix is used to combine vertically related events in the pathway. It uniquely defines 
the resulting likelihood estimate for any binary combination of input likelihoods. Combination 
matrices standardise the evaluation of resulting risk along events constituting a specific pathway. 
Hence, they may contribute to the reliability/repeatability of the overall risk estimation. Once the rules 
in the matrix are established, application of this approach to sequentially combine the likelihoods may 
limit the need to interpret the outcomes. Therefore, the specific combination rules implemented in the 
model by combination matrices (Tables 13 and 15) was discussed and agreed by the Working Group.  
10.1.3.1. Deriving total likelihood estimates of events influenced by multiple independent, 
horizontally related events in the pathway  
If several independent events which could happen at the same time contribute to the likelihood 
estimate of a given event in the risk assessment, the greatest likelihood estimate of these independent 
events was used in the downstream calculations and determined the likelihood estimate of the given 
event. 
Table 12:  Example 1: Exposure of the first pig holding in the EU to H3N2pM/H3N2v  
 
Three independent horizontally related events in the pathway may contribute to the event in the risk 
pathway ―the exposure of pigs at the first pig holding in the EU to H3N2pM/H3N2v‖, namely contact 
between infected humans (non-professionals and/or professionals) and pigs and/or contact between an 
infected imported pig and a susceptible pig (in a EU pig holding). These events could happen at the 
same time. To determine the risk estimate of the event ‗exposure of the first pig holding‘, the greatest 
likelihood is used to define the overall risk. In the example below, the likelihood for exposure of 
susceptible pigs is low (N + L + N = L).  
10.1.3.2. Combination of likelihood estimates of dependent vertically related events in the pathway 
If a risk pathway consists of events that are completely dependent on the outcome of the previous 
event, then the principles of conditional probabilities can be applied. There are animal health-related 
examples where such combination matrices were applied (EFSA, 2011, 2013) and the risk matrices 
described by Wieland et al. (2011) were used to combine pairs of events in the risk pathway that 
described an exclusive cascade of events (e.g. ―exposure of the first holding‖ followed by 
―susceptibility of pigs from first holding‖ leads into ―first infected holding‖). Table 13 provides the 
matrix applied to combine likelihood estimates of such cascading, or dependent, events.  
With this matrix, increase of likelihood along a pathway is not possible. The matrix principle transfers 
the multiplication of conditional probabilities to combinations of qualitative likelihood levels.  
 
 
Event in risk pathway Event Probability that 
event will occur 
Exposure of the first pig holding in 
the EU to H3N2pM/H3N2v  
Non-professional in contact with pigs of first 
pig holding 
N 
Professional in contact with pigs of first pig 
holding 
L 
Breeding pig of US in contact with pigs of 
first pig holding 
N 
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Table 13:  Combination matrix 1, used to evaluate two likelihood estimates based on the assumption 
that the second event is conditional on the first event  
Event 1 Event 2 
Negligible Low Moderate High 
Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible 
Low Negligible Low Low Low 
Moderate Low Low Moderate Moderate 
High Low Moderate Moderate High 
Matrix 1, based on Wieland et al. (2011), was adapted to four likelihood categories, and agreed by the Working Group. 
Application: if event 1 has an estimate ―low‖ and event 2 an estimate ―moderate‖, the combined estimate of the sequence 
event1 and event 2 will be ―low‖. 
 
The matrix was also applied to combine events assessing the efficacy of risk mitigation measures. 
Usually these measures have to be assessed in a logical order (clinical signs, identification animal by 
vet at border inspection post and effective measures to mitigate the further progression along the 
pathway) leading to an effective case detection and response. The corresponding likelihood estimates 
of those consecutive events are combined with matrix 1 (Table 13). 
Table 14:  Example 2: Detection and response at BIP exporting country 
 
It is assumed that there are three events representing the effectiveness of confirming a case and every 
event depends on a previous one (identifying a case, reporting a case and confirming a case). 
According to the model, combination matrix 1 is applied stepwise to combine the estimates. In the 
example shown above, the probability of being effective in confirming a case was ―low‖. In this case 
the risk estimate for detection and effective response at the border inspection post (BIP) of the 
exporting country will be L x H x H = L. 
10.1.3.3. Combination of likelihood estimates of non-dependent events that are vertically related in the 
risk pathway 
This approach considers pairs of events in the risk pathway that describe independent events. 
Where an increase in the overall risk is possible between events, for example because of an increased 
number of infected animals (spread of disease), there is a need to reflect such a scenario in the 
combination matrix used to combine the likelihood estimates of non-dependent events. An example of 
such a matrix was presented by Zepeda-Sein (1998) (Table 15). 
Table 15 provides the matrix applied to combine likelihood estimates of such non-dependent events. If 
the risk estimate of one event is ―low‖ but that of the second event is ―high‖, the combined likelihood 
will be ―moderate‖. Hence, the overall risk is assumed to be between ―low‖ and ―high‖. The matrix 
principle transfers the average of independent probabilities to combinations of qualitative risk levels.  
 
 
Event in risk pathway Event Probability that 
event will occur 
Detection and response at 
BIP exporting country 
Infectious pig to be exported shows clinical signs L 
Animal with clinical signs is/gets identified H 
Effective measures in place to prevent infected pig to be 
exported 
H 
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Table 15:  Combination matrix 2 is used to evaluate two likelihood estimates that were independent 
of each other.  
Event 1 Event 2 
Negligible Low Moderate High 
Negligible Negligible Low Low Moderate 
Low Low Low Moderate Moderate 
Moderate Low Moderate Moderate High 
High Moderate Moderate High High 
Matrix 2 was based on Zepeda et al. (1998) and agreed by the working group. Application: if event 1 has estimate ―low‖ and 
event 2 has estimate ―moderate‖, the combined estimate of event 1 or event 2 worsening the situation will be ―moderate‖. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Example 3: Spread of H3N2pM/H3N2v into unaffected areas  
It is assumed that two events influence the likelihood of further spread of the disease into unaffected 
areas: ‗no detection of first infected holding and no response‘; and ‗infected pig(s) moves to second 
holding‘. The events independently influence the risk for unaffected areas. Therefore, combination 
matrix 2 has to be applied to combine the estimates. In this example, the probability of a pig from a 
second holding being exposed to pigs infected would be ―H‖. 
In the risk flow pathway developed for the current risk assessment (Figures 2, 3 and 4), if the event in 
the risk pathway relates to a human involvement, the boxes are coloured yellow and if they involve 
pigs are coloured purple. The estimates of the basic events are combined using either matrix 1 (Table 
13), indicated by green, dashed arrows chaining consecutive events, or matrix 2 (Table 15), indicated 
by orange dotted arrows coupling events that represent independent events. 
The estimate for the effectiveness of a mitigation measure related to an event is first converted into the 
opposite outcome (e.g. ―effective response‖  ―non-effective response‖, shown by two adjacent boxes 
linked with a black arrow). The corresponding effectiveness estimate is converted into a risk estimate 
by taking the reminder of 1 (e.g. ―low‖  ―1 – low = high‖) (see Table 4 of Wieland et al., 2011). 
10.2. Results 
Part 1: What is the likelihood of viable H3N2v (humans) or H3N2pM (pigs) virus entering the EU, 
followed by exposure and infection of the first pig holding? 
Two risk pathways were developed, considering two possible scenarios for Part 1 in terms of 
biosecurity and/or management measures implemented by the farmer during the initial 30 days that 
pigs imported into the EU must remain at the holding of destination. Details of the likelihood 
estimates given by the experts are provided in Table 17 in Appendix B. 
The first scenario (Figure 2) assumed application of adequate biosecurity and an efficient separation 
of the imported pigs from those already present in the holding during the whole 30-day period in 
which these pigs are required to remain at the holding before being allowed to move from the holding. 
During the separation the imported pigs would always be kept in isolation without direct or indirect 
contact with other pigs to prevent the transmission of pathogens while the animals were undergoing 
observation and, if the farmers decided that it would be needed, testing and treatment. It must be 
Event 1: How likely is it that the first infected holding is not 
detected and therefore without an effective response? 
H 
  
Event 2: How likely is it that pigs from first infected holding 
move to other holdings in the same Member State? 
H 
H  H = H 
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noted, as mentioned above, that legislation requires only that imported pigs remain for 30 days on the 
holding, but no requirements are laid down for what measures are to be applied during this period.  
 
Figure 2:  Part 1, scenario 1. Risk pathway for entry of influenza A (H3N2pM/H3N2v) virus in the 
EU and exposure and infection of the first pig herd in the EU, when the imported pigs have to remain 
in the holdings in effective separation for 30 days after import.  
The risk assessment differentiated the likelihood of entry of H3N2v through travelling of two 
categories of people to the EU from the USA. The first category comprised people who are not 
working in the pig sector and without a specific interest in pig fairs. The second category comprised 
people professionally involved in the pig sector or people regularly visiting pig fairs. The likelihood 
that H3N2v would be present within the first category of people travelling to the EU was considered 
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negligible compared with a low likelihood of H3N2v presence within the second category of people. 
This difference would be mainly due to the more frequent and intense contact with pigs expected from 
the second category of people.  
Besides the possible entry of H3N2v through infectious people travelling from USA to the EU, import 
of infectious breeding pigs was also considered as a potential pathway for entry of H3N2pM. 
Considering the low likelihood of H3N2pM being present in pigs to be exported from the USA, the 
fact that H3N2pM infection does not necessarily induce clinical signs in pigs, the fact that the duration 
of the journey assumed will allow some pigs to get clear from the infection, and the high likelihood 
that infectious breeding pigs pass through the visual inspections both at the exporting holding and at 
the importing BIP, the overall risk of importing infectious pigs was considered to be low. 
Given that infectious breeding pigs would pass undetected with a low likelihood of being detected 
through the visual inspections  both at the exporting holding and at the importing BIP, and assuming 
that breeding pigs imported from any third country, including the USA, are kept in effective separation 
for 30 days upon decision of the farmer at the first pig holding in the EU, the likelihood that the 
breeding pigs in separation will remain infectious at the end of that time was considered to be 
negligible. Following this, the likelihood of consequent exposure of the pigs in the first EU holding to 
H3N2pM would be negligible. 
The overall likelihood of a first holding in the EU being infected after exposure to H3N2pM/H3N2v 
through either imported infectious pigs or humans coming from the USA was expected to be low.  
The experts judged that the pigs in the EU would be highly susceptible to H3N2pM as only limited 
cross-immunity would be present.  
The second scenario (Figure 3) included only one difference, namely there was no initial separation 
of the imported pigs in the holding and so the imported pigs would be immediately housed together 
with the other pigs in the holding. This resulted in a low likelihood that pigs in EU would be exposed 
to H3N2pM, compared with the negligible likelihood of exposure of pigs in the EU to H3N2pM 
through contact with infectious breeding pigs from US pigs in scenario 1 (Figure 2), where a 
separation of the imported pigs was considered. 
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Figure 3:  Part 1, scenario 2. Risk pathway for entry of influenza A (H3N2pM/H3N2v) virus in the 
EU and exposure and infection of the first pig holding in the EU, without prior separation of the 
imported pigs  
It should be noted that the model is highly sensitive to the estimated prevalence of H3N2pM/H3N2v in 
imported pigs and travelling humans; however, this estimated prevalence is associated with a high 
uncertainty. Increasing this estimate would increase the likelihood of exposure of the pigs in the first 
holding, especially when there is no initial separation of the imported pigs at the farm level. 
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The use of matrix 1 for combining the likelihoods of dependent events that are vertically related may 
have led to an underestimation of the risk of a first EU holding to become infected, as this matrix was 
designed to evaluate the effectiveness of actions taken to mitigate risk of introduction only. 
Part 2: What is the likelihood of H3N2pM (pigs) virus spreading through the movement of infected 
pigs from the first infected holding followed by exposure and infection of a second holding? 
The likelihood of spread of H3N2pM by pigs to second holdings (in the same Member State) from the 
first holding was expected to be high since an intense movement of pigs from the first holding is 
expected, and there is a high likelihood that pigs in a second holding will be susceptible (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4:  Part 2. Risk pathway for the spread of influenza A (H3N2pM/H3N2v) virus, from an 
infected holding to second pig holdings in the same Member State (applicable for both scenarios of 
Part 1) 
Legislation for movements of pigs to another Member State requires official animal health 
examination and certification prior to movement which will increase the likelihood of detection of 
infection in the first holding and lead to a response (prohibit dispatch) in case clinical signs are 
observed. The overall likelihood of a first holding in the EU being infected after exposure to 
H3N2pM/H3N2v through either imported infectious pigs or infectious humans was considered to be 
low. Effective separation of imported pigs from other pigs at farm level for a period of 30 days 
reduces the likelihood of exposure to newly entered influenza strains. 
 
When no initial separation of the imported pigs is considered (scenario 2), the likelihood of pigs from 
the first holding being exposed to H3N2pM through imported infectious pigs would be low (compared 
with negligible in scenario 1, where a separation of the imported pigs is considered). 
Should the virus be introduced in a first pig holding, the likelihood of spread of H3N2pM by pigs to 
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estimated prevalence is associated with a high uncertainty. Increasing this estimate would increase the 
likelihood of exposure of the pigs in the first holding, especially when there is no initial separation of 
the imported pigs at the farm level. 
11. ToR1 - the significance for the health of pigs of the occurrence of influenza A (H3N2v) 
virus in a naive population 
Three different scenarios of H3N2 naivety and/or immune status that represent most current situations 
in the European pig population and the significance for the health of pigs upon entry of 
A(H3N2)/H3N3pM virus are considered in Section 8.4. 
The scientific background to evaluate the significance of an infection with this strain for the health of 
naïve pigs can be found in Section 3.1 (infection with H3N2pM in pigs), Chapter 4 (pathogenesis of 
influenza H3N2v in pigs), Chapter 6 (epidemiology of H3N2 influenza viruses in pigs in EU including 
detection of reassortants) and Chapter 8 (cross-immunity to North American H3N2 swine influenza 
viruses in Europe).  
11.1. Conclusions 
 The clinical significance of infection with H3N2pM virus is comparable to that of infection 
with other SIVs, as seen in the past in Europe in a naive pig population.  
 Pathogenicity studies in pigs experimentally inoculated with H3N2v show that the infection is 
of purely respiratory nature and shows a variable but relatively mild course with fever, 
coughing and inappetence similar to that of the endemic SIVs currently circulating in swine 
populations worldwide.  
 In field infections with H3N2pM in pigs in the USA (agricultural fairs), a subclinical course 
was very common, and when clinical signs were observed (coughing, fever), they were 
generally mild, with low morbidity and no mortality. These signs can be exacerbated by other 
factors such as secondary bacterial infections so the clinical spectrum may be variable. 
 Infection with a European H3N2 SIV will not induce cross-reactive serum antibodies against 
H3N2v; however, a certain level of cross protection may be achieved via cell mediated 
immunity and mucosal immunity 
 Due to low-level circulation or absence of H3N2 in some areas in recent years, the European 
pig population has variable immune status to European H3N2 viruses. Such areas might have 
holdings that are more susceptible to H3N2pM than holdings in regions where H3N2 is 
prevalent.  
 It is expected that previous infection with either of the European SIV virus subtypes (H1N1, 
H3N2, H1N2) would reduce the negative impact on the health of pigs following an infection 
with H3N2pM.  
12. ToR2 - the current situation in the EU as regards the risk of a possible introduction of 
influenza A (H3N2v/H3n2pM) virus in particular to EU pig herds and the diagnostic 
capabilities to early detect an incursion 
The risk question included in the first part of the ToR, ―the current situation in the EU as regards the 
risk of a possible introduction of influenza A (H3N2v/H3N2pM) virus in particular to EU pig 
holdings‖, was split into two parts: 
 Part 1: What is the likelihood of viable H3N2v (humans) or H3N2pM (pigs) virus entering 
the EU, followed by exposure and infection of the first pig holding? 
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 Part 2: What is the likelihood of H3N2pM (pigs) virus spreading through the movement of 
infected pigs from the first infected holding followed by exposure and infection of the second 
holding? 
Two risk pathways were developed, one for each of these two parts. Two possible scenarios were 
developed for Part 1, considering different biosecurity and/or management measures that the farmer 
takes during the 30 days that pigs imported into the EU must remain on the holding of destination 
(Section 10.2). Assumptions made are described in Section 10.1.1, the model parameters in Section 
10.1.2 and the combination of risk estimates in Section 10.1.3.  
The second part of the ToR, asks for a ―current situation in the EU as regards…the diagnostic 
capabilities to early detect an incursion‖. The reply to the second part of this ToR is supported by the 
scientific background presented in Section 7.1.1 (diagnostic capabilities). 
12.1. Conclusions on the risk of introduction of H3N2v/H3N2pM into EU pig holdings 
 Taking into account the possible contact with infectious pigs in the USA, the duration of the 
journey to travel to the EU and the length of the infectious period, the likelihood of pigs in the 
EU being exposed to H3N2v by persons working in the pig sector or visiting pig fairs 
regularly was considered to be low. 
 Taking into account the possible contact with infectious pigs in the USA, the assumed 
duration of the journey to travel to the EU and the length of the infectious period, the 
likelihood of pigs in the EU being exposed to H3N2v by persons not working in the pig sector 
or visiting pig fairs regularly was considered to be negligible. 
 Considering the low likelihood of H3N2pM being present in pigs to be exported from the 
USA, the fact that H3N2pM infection does not necessarily induce clinical signs in pigs and the 
high likelihood that infectious breeding pigs pass through the visual inspections both at the 
exporting holding and at the importing border inspection post, the overall risk of importing 
infectious pigs in the EU was considered to be low. 
 When breeding pigs imported from any third country, including the USA, are kept in effective 
separation for 30 days, upon decision of the farmer of the first pig holding in the EU, the 
likelihood that the breeding pigs in separation would remain infectious at the end of that time 
would be negligible and the likelihood that the pigs in the importing holding would be 
exposed to H3N2pM would be negligible. 
 When the imported pigs are not kept separate for 30 days, the likelihood that the pigs in the 
importing holding in the EU would be exposed to H3N2pM would be low. 
 Effective separation at farm level of pigs imported from affected countries for a period of 30 
days reduces the probability of EU pigs being exposed to this new influenza strain through 
imported infected pigs. 
 Given that a first holding is infected, the likelihood of spread of H3N2pM by pigs to second 
holdings in the same Member State was expected to be high, assuming frequent movement of 
pigs between holdings and a high likelihood for pigs in a second holding to be susceptible.  
12.2. Conclusions on diagnostic capabilities to detect at an early stage an incursion of H3N2v 
in the EU 
 Early detection of H3N2pM/H3N2v in the EU is not likely owing to the currently limited 
surveillance efforts in combination with routine diagnostic methods which are not able to 
specifically identify this new strain. 
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 Currently applied real time RT-PCRs based on the matrix (M) or the nucleoprotein (NP) gene 
are capable of detecting all of the influenza A viruses known to be endemic in European pigs 
plus emergent strains such as rH3N2p from North America. However, neither these tests nor 
real time RT-PCRs based on H3 or N2 genes are able to specifically identify the H3N2pM as 
being different from European strains. 
 The panel of serological reagents for conventional typing will reliably type all H3N2 strains. 
The H3N2pM will raise a different reactivity profile in such assays, owing to its antigenic 
differences when compared with European H3N2 SIVs.  
 Only by combining currently applied diagnostic approaches with gene sequencing will it be 
possible to identify H3N2pM should it occur in Europe either in pigs or in humans. All of 
these diagnostic approaches are relevant to the timely identification of variant viruses or new 
strains that may appear in European pigs. This combination is not done on a routine basis and 
there is no official surveillance for SIV as this is not a listed disease. 
 A series of EU-funded networks through the ESNIP programme has greatly strengthened and 
enabled harmonisation of approaches for diagnosis of and surveillance for swine influenza 
within many EU laboratories. 
12.3. Recommendations on diagnostic capabilities to early detect an incursion of H3N2v in 
the EU 
 Further increase the capability of the national reference laboratories to detect variant viruses. 
 Expand the use of standardized methods and reagents including controls for the diagnosis of 
influenza to all EU/EEA Member States.  
 Establish proficiency trials for swine influenza testing in all EU/EEA Member States‘ 
reference laboratories. 
 Considering the role that pigs play as mixing vessels for influenza viruses, and hence their 
importance in terms of public health, reinforce monitoring of SIVs on pig farms and link this 
to surveillance of influenza viruses in humans.  
 Consider both passive surveillance and monitoring. Passive surveillance is important for early 
detection of new emerging viruses, focusing on holdings with clinical signs of respiratory 
diseases and conducting full characterisation of isolated SIVs. In addition, a broader picture of 
the circulating influenza virus strains in pig holdings in EU should be obtained from well-
designed monitoring, including healthy pigs. 
13. ToR3 - the implications and consequences of the possible evolution of the influenza A 
(H3N2v) virus on pig health such as clinical manifestation, transmission between pigs and 
specially the risk that animals from a herd which was infected with influenza A (H3N2v) 
virus spreads the virus after the last clinical signs of disease have been observed 
This ToR is considered in two parts (A and B):  
A) Implications and consequences of the possible evolution of the influenza A (H3N2v) virus on 
pig health such as clinical manifestation and transmission between pigs  
Different scenarios can be foreseen in terms of immune status after previous infection with the 
contemporary European SIVs H1N1, H1N2 H3N2, as well as the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, and/or 
possible vaccination with European swine influenza vaccines described in ToR1, with different 
clinical implications in case H3N2pM/H3N2v would enter the European swine population. 
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The possible evolution of the infection in the pig population (transmission, pig health) is described and 
the possible impact on the pig population considering the current population immunity of the EU is 
assessed (see Chapter 8). Some information can also be found in Chapters 4 (pathogenesis of influenza 
H3N2v in pigs) and 6 (epidemiology of H3N2 influenza viruses in pigs in EU including detection of 
reassortants).  
The assessment of possible spread of H3N2pM is described in Chapter 10. 
B) Risk that animals from a holding which was infected with influenza A (H3N2v) virus spread 
the virus after the last clinical signs of disease have been observed 
The scientific background to evaluate this risk can be found in Chapter 4 (pathogenesis of influenza 
H3N2v infection in pigs), and in the Chapter 8 (cross-immunity to H3N2v in Europe).  
13.1. Conclusions on the implications and consequences of the possible evolution of the 
H3N2v virus on pig  
 Because of the antigenic differences between H3N2pM and the H3N2 viruses that have been 
circulating in European pigs since the mid-1980s it is considered likely that, should H3N2pM 
enter the European pig population, it would have the potential to cause disease, to spread and 
to become endemic. It can then be expected that, as seen with other SIVs, host selection 
pressures will drive this strain to evolve whereby changes in the gene segments, especially 
those encoding the external glycoproteins (HA and NA), will appear. 
 Based on previous experiences with influenza viruses that emerged in the past and adapted to 
swine, the risk that a H3N2v/H3N2pM virus becomes endemic in some areas after entering 
the European swine population is high (see ToR2). 
 Cross-infection studies with the well-known endemic European H3N2 SIVs indicate that prior 
infection with these viruses may confer some degree of cross-protection against infection with 
the H3N2pM/H3N2v viruses.  
 According to the risk assessment developed in Chapter 10, given that a first holding is 
infected, the likelihood of spread of H3N2pM by pigs to second holdings is expected to be 
high in the context of unrestricted movement of pigs from the first holding and a high 
likelihood that pigs in a second holding are susceptible.  
13.2. Conclusions on the virus spread after the last clinical signs have disappeared 
 Clinical signs after SIV infection, H3N2V/H3N2pM infection included, are often absent or 
mild and their duration is variable (i.e. until 3 dpi in mild cases, until 5–6 dpi in severe cases). 
By analogy with other SIVs and based on the limited pathogenesis studies with H3N2v in 
pigs, it can be inferred that the virus excretion in individual pigs can last up to 7 dpi. Clinical 
signs are generally associated with viral shedding; however, virus excretion does not entirely 
coincide with presence of clinical signs (may start earlier or last longer than clinical signs). 
Consequently, an absence of clinical signs cannot be used as evidence that pigs are not 
infectious.  
 At farm level SIV infections can be maintained with a continuous introduction of susceptible 
pigs. Therefore, the risk of spread from holdings can remain high for an extended period of 
time even after cessation of clinical signs. This takes place particularly when susceptible pigs 
continuously enter the fattening unit. 
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13.3. Recommendations on the virus spread after last clinical signs have disappeared 
 Since the absence of clinical signs is not a reliable basis on which to decide that H3N2pM 
virus is no longer circulating in an infected holding where no new pigs have entered, it is 
recommended that, when the health status with regard to excretion of such viruses from a farm 
needs to be known, nasal/oropharyngeal swabs focussing on pigs of 8–12 weeks of age should 
be tested by RT-PCR to confirm the absence of H3N2pM virus. 
14. ToR4 - the possibility, efficacy and efficiency of vaccination in pigs, using the existing 
vaccines or newly developed vaccines against influenza A (H3N2v) virus, also in relation 
with the possible evolution of variants of influenza viruses posing a risk to public and 
animal health  
In this ToR, the term ―efficiency‖ is interpreted as effectiveness. Below is a brief assessment of each 
of the specific questions mentioned in ToR4. The background information used to answer these 
questions can be found under Chapters 4 and 8 of this document. For clarity, vaccination in pigs using 
existing vaccines or newly developed vaccines against influenza A (H3N2v) is treated separately. The 
terms ―possibility‖, ―efficacy‖ and ―effectiveness‖ are defined as follows: 
 The ―possibility‖ of vaccination means availability of the vaccine. 
 The ―efficacy‖ of vaccination means, according to the European Pharmacopoeia, the ability of 
the vaccine to offer significant virological protection in an experimental setting, i.e. after a 
double vaccination of influenza-naive pigs and challenge with H3N2v virus three weeks after 
the second vaccination. Virological protection is defined as a significant reduction in virus 
titres in the lungs of vaccinated pigs compared with unvaccinated challenge control pigs. 
 The ―effectiveness‖ of vaccination means the ability of the vaccine to reduce virus circulation 
under field conditions.  
14.1. Existing vaccines 
 Possibility of vaccination: Inactivated vaccines based on the endemic SIVs are commercially 
available in many, but not all, European countries. Most vaccines are bivalent and contain 
H1N1 and H3N2 virus strains; one vaccine is trivalent and also includes the recently emerged 
H1N2 strain. However, the H3N2 virus strains present in European vaccines show substantial 
genetic and antigenic differences compared with the H3N2 virus that forms part of the SIV 
vaccines in the USA. There has been no need to update H3N2 vaccine strains in European SIV 
vaccines since strain evolution and variation has been minor and the original vaccine strains 
have, until now, induced sufficient efficacy. 
 Efficacy of vaccination: No challenge studies have been done to examine to what extent SIV 
vaccines in Europe protect against H3N2pM. Serological investigations of pigs vaccinated 
with various existing European SIV vaccines allow the expectation that these vaccines will 
induce no or few cross-reactive HI antibodies against H3N2pM and thus may not reduce 
H3N2v virus replication in the lungs to a significant degree. This assumption is based on the 
fact that influenza virus replication in the lungs of vaccinated pigs correlates negatively with 
post-vaccination HI antibody titres against the challenge virus.  
The European situation is not at all comparable with that in the USA, where H3N2 strains 
included in the licensed US vaccines show a much closer antigenic match with the H3N2pM 
virus and these vaccines have been demonstrated to offer significant cross-protection against 
rH3N2p viruses.  
 Effectiveness of vaccination: Data about the effectiveness of vaccination against the H3N2pM 
virus are lacking. As European vaccines, in general, are not expected to be efficacious against 
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H3N2pM, effectiveness of vaccination will likely be very low. Furthermore, it must be 
remembered that vaccination is voluntary, that vaccination rates vary in different countries 
and that H3N2 virus seroprevalence in swine populations in different European countries, 
which may influence effectiveness , is highly variable (see Table 1, Chapter 6, ESNIP 3). 
Voluntary vaccination of swine with the existing SIV vaccines has not succeeded in halting 
the circulation of SIV in the swine population, neither in Europe nor in the USA. It is 
unknown if, and to what degree, obligatory SIV vaccination could reduce the virus circulation. 
14.2. New vaccines 
 Possibility of vaccination: A monovalent inactivated vaccine specifically based on H3N2pM 
virus for use in pigs is not licensed neither in the USA nor in Europe. It would, however, be 
possible to develop such a vaccine in a rather short time interval based on the experience of 
development and production of other SIV vaccines. 
 Efficacy of vaccination: If such vaccine were to be available, it would be expected to induce 
immunity and cross-protection similar to that induced by existing European SIV vaccines 
against the endemic European SIVs. 
 Effectiveness of vaccination: There are no data about the effectiveness of widespread 
vaccination with H3N2v vaccines in pigs in the field. Based on the experience with existing 
SIV vaccines and endemic SIVs, voluntary vaccination is unlikely to halt the circulation of 
H3N2v virus in the swine population. It is unknown if, and to what degree, obligatory 
vaccination could reduce virus circulation. 
14.3. Potential evolution of variants of influenza viruses posing a serious risk to public and 
animal health 
 Evolution of variants of H3N2pM virus posing a serious risk to animal health: As mentioned 
above, vaccination is unlikely to prevent the spread of H3N2pM virus in European pig 
populations in the event that this virus enters and become endemic in Europe. The emergence 
of novel reassortants of influenza viruses is unpredictable, but it will probably increase if 
H3N2pM enters the European pig population, and such events are unlikely to be prevented by 
vaccination. In addition, it cannot be excluded that vaccination increases the risk of antigenic 
drift by selection of neutralisation-resistant escape mutants by vaccine-induced antibodies. 
The latter phenomenon, however, has not yet been observed with the existing vaccines and 
endemic SIVs. 
 Evolution of variants of H3N2pM virus posing a serious risk to human health: For the same 
reasons mentioned above, vaccination of swine, even if able to reduce virus replication in the 
respiratory tract, is unlikely to prevent the emergence of variants of H3N2pM virus with 
increased transmissibility to humans. However, based on previous experience, a divergent 
evolution of H3N2pM in pigs compared with that in humans is likely, thus making it unlikely 
that virus with increased transmissibility to humans would evolve.  
14.4. Conclusions 
 Immunity resulting from vaccination with commercially available European SIV vaccines is 
expected to provide no or only a low level of cross-protection against infection with the 
H3N2pM influenza viruses, whereas vaccines based on North American swine H3N2 viruses 
would offer superior protection. Such vaccines may significantly reduce H3N2pM replication 
in the lungs in vaccinated animals. Voluntary vaccination of pigs with existing vaccines has 
not succeeded in halting the circulation of SIV in the swine population and this limitation is 
also considered valid for H3N2pM. 
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 According to the available data, H3N2pM is not present in the European swine population and 
no measures are needed with regard to vaccination. If such a virus were to enter into Europe 
and spread in the swine population, then the use of vaccines based on the closely related TR 
H3N2 strains could be useful.  
 Vaccination might increase antigenic drift of circulating influenza strains, and newly 
appearing variants might not be neutralised by vaccine-induced antibodies. However, based on 
current knowledge there is no indication that this has happened with the use of the available 
inactivated SIV vaccines in the European pig population.  
14.5. Recommendations 
 The possibility of using more specific vaccines, based on the closely related US swine TR 
H3N2 virus strains, should be assessed, as a possible emergency procedure, in the event of a 
change in the epidemiological situation, i.e. if the H3N2pM/H3N2v virus were to enter the 
European pig population. 
14.6. Recommendations for future research 
 Experimental cross-protection studies with H3N2pM challenge in pigs previously infected 
with the major European SIV subtypes should be carried out.  
 Experimental vaccination-challenge studies with the existing European and American SIV 
vaccines and H3N2pM challenge should be carried out. The extent of protection conferred by 
different vaccines should be compared. 
15. ToR5 - the most important factors to be monitored that would suggest a risk for the 
emergence of a new pandemic influenza strain from the influenza A (H3N2v) virus 
The background information used to answer this question can be found under Chapters 7 (influenza 
surveillance in Europe including diagnostic capabilities), 8 (Section 8.4, cross-immunity in humans) 
and 9 (emergence of a new pandemic strain from H3N2v). 
15.1. Conclusions 
 New influenza strains emerge through natural reassortment and/or mutations.  
 Past experience has shown that reassortment events involving inter-species transmission are 
necessary steps in the evolution of new pandemic strains. However, it is not always clear in 
which species these events occur. Monitoring for reassortant viruses should therefore include 
as important target species both pigs and poultry. 
 Several molecular markers in influenza virus genes have been reported as being associated 
with certain biological properties, such as receptor binding, host and tissue tropism, virulence, 
and modulation of host immune response, as well as efficiency of replication and 
transmission. These associations have been inconsistent between strains. 
 Studies in animal models have reaffirmed and highlighted the importance of individual virus 
proteins, such as the HA, NA, polymerase and non-structural proteins, and even point 
mutations within these molecules, for cross-species transmission. They have also emphasised 
that the correlation between the molecular markers and biological properties is not absolute. 
Virulence and pathogenesis are not the properties of a single gene or protein. They are 
polygenic and the specific gene constellation is also important.  
 Currently, the number and type of mutations, as well as the genetic constellation needed for 
efficient human-to-human transmission of H3N2v, is unknown.  
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 Based on current knowledge, it is not possible to predict which changes (mutations or 
reassortments) within H3N2v could enable it become a new pandemic influenza virus. Hence, 
it does not seem possible, at present, to set up a system to monitor ―the most important factors 
that would suggest a risk of emergence of a new pandemic strain from the influenza A 
(H3N2v) virus. 
15.2. Recommendations  
 Ensure appropriate monitoring in pigs to permit early identification of newly appearing strains 
(e.g. novel reassortants) which might cross the animal–human interface. 
 Develop a European strategy for appropriate surveillance of humans in close contact with 
swine.  
  
                                                                                                 Risks posed by the influenza H3N2v 
H3N2v   
EFSA Journal 2013;11(10):3383 52 
REFERENCES 
Bányai K, Kovács E, Tóth ÁG, Biksi I, Szentpáli-Gavallér K, Bálint Á, Dencső L and Dán Á, 2012. 
Genome sequence of a monoreassortant H1N1 swine influenza virus isolated from a pig in 
Hungary. Journal of Virology, 86, 13133–13133. 
Bateman AC, Karamanska R, Busch MG, Dell A, Olsen CW and Haslam SM, 2010. Glycan Analysis 
and Influenza A Virus Infection of Primary Swine Respiratory Epithelial Cells. Journal of 
Biological Chemistry, 285, 34016–34026. 
Bialas KM, Desmet EA and Takimoto T, 2012. Specific residues in the 2009 H1N1 swine-origin 
influenza matrix protein influence virion morphology and efficiency of viral spread in vitro. PloS 
One 7, e50595. 
Bouvier NM and Palese P, 2008. The biology of influenza viruses. Vaccine, 26, D49–D53. 
Bowman AS, Sreevatsan S, Killian ML, Page SL, Nelson SW, Nolting JM, Cardona C and Slemons 
RD, 2012. Molecular evidence for interspecies transmission of H3N2pM/H3N2v influenza A 
viruses at an Ohio agricultural fair, July 2012. Emerging Microbes Infection, 1, e33. 
Brown IH. 2000. The epidemiology and evolution of influenza viruses in pigs. Veterinary 
Microbiology, 74(1–2), 29–46. 
Brown IH, Done SH, Spencer YI, Cooley WA, Harris PA and Alexander DJ, 1993. Pathogenicity of a 
swine influenza H1N1 virus antigenically distinguishable from classical and European strains. 
Veterinary Record, 132, 598–602. 
Castrucci MR, Donatelli I, Sidoli L, Barigazzi G, Kawaoka Y and Webster RG.1993. Genetic 
reassortment between avian and human influenza A viruses in Italian pigs. Virology, 193,503–506. 
CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), online. Overview of influenza surveillance in the 
United States. Available online: http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/overview.htm 
CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), 2011a. Limited human-to-human transmission of 
novel influenza A (H3N2) virus—Iowa, November 2011. MMWR, 60(47), 1615–1617. 
CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), 2011b. Swine-origin influenza A (H3N2) virus 
infections in two children—Indiana and Pennsylvania, July–August, 2011. MMWR, 60(35), 1213–
1215. 
CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), 2012a. Update: influenza A (H3N2)v transmission 
and guidelines—five states, 2011. MMWR, 60(51), 1741–1744.  
CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), 2012b. Influenza A (H3N2) variant virus-related 
hospitalizations—Ohio, 2012. MMWR, 61(38), 764–767. 
CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), 2012c. Notes from the field: outbreak of influenza 
A (H3N2) virus among persons and swine at a county fair—Indiana, July 2012. MMWR, 61(29), 
561.  
CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), 2012d. Antibodies cross-reactive to influenza A 
(H3N2) variant virus and impact of 2010–2011 seasonal influenza vaccine on cross-reactive 
antibodies—United States. MMWR, 61(14), 237–241.  
Chen L, Rivailler P, Hossain J, Carney P, Balish A, Perry I, Davis CT, Garten R, Shu B and Xu X, 
2011. Receptor specificity of subtype H1 influenza A viruses isolated from swine and humans in 
the United States. Virology, 412, 401–410. 
Chiapponi C, Moreno A, Barbieri I, Merenda M and Foni E, 2012. Multiplex RT-PCR assay for 
differentiating European swine influenza virus subtypes H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2. Journal of 
Virological Methods,, 184, 117–120.  
                                                                                                 Risks posed by the influenza H3N2v 
H3N2v   
EFSA Journal 2013;11(10):3383 53 
Chou Y, Albrecht RA, Pica N, Lowen AC, Richt JA, García-Sastre A, Palese P and Hai R, 2011. The 
M segment of the 2009 new pandemic H1N1 influenza virus is critical for its high transmission 
efficiency in the guinea pig model. Journal of Virology, 85, 11235–11241. 
Connor RJ, Kawaoka Y, Webster RG and Paulson JC, 1994. Receptor specificity in human, avian, and 
equine H2 and H3 influenza virus isolates. Virology, 205, 17–23. 
Cox CM, Neises D, Garten RJ, Bryant B, Hesse RA, Anderson GA, Trevino-Garrison I, Shu B, 
Lindstrom S, Klimov AI and Finelli L, 2011. Swine influenza virus A (H3N2) infection in human, 
Kansas, USA, 2009. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 17, 1143–1144. doi: 10.3201/eid/1706.101488. 
Cox LA Jr., 2008. What‘s wrong with risk matrices? Risk Analysis, 28, 497–512. doi: 10.1111/j.1539-
6924.2008.01030.x. 
de Jong JC, Smith DJ, Lapedes AS, Donatelli I, Campitelli L, Barigazzi G, Van Reeth K, Jones TC, 
Rimmelzwaan GF, Osterhaus AD and Fouchier RA, 2007. Antigenic and genetic evolution of 
swine influenza A (H3N2) viruses in Europe. Journal of Virology, 81, 4315–4322.  
De Vleeschauwer A, Atanasova K, Van Borm S, van den Berg T, Rasmussen TB, Uttenthal A and 
Van Reeth K, 2009. Comparative pathogenesis of an avian H5N2 and a swine H1N1 influenza 
virus in pigs. PloS One, 4(8), e6662. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0006662. 
De Vleeschauwer AR, Van Poucke SG, Karasin AL, Olsen CW and Van Reeth K, 2011. Cross-
protection between antigenically distinct H1N1 swine influenza viruses from Europe and North 
America. Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses, 5, 115–122. 
Dormitzer PR, Galli G, Castellino F, Golding H, Khurana S, Del Giudice G and Rappuoli R, 2011. 
Influenza vaccine immunology. Immunological Reviews, 239, 167–177. 
Ducatez MF, Hause B, Stigger-Rosser E, Darnell D, Corzo C, Juleen K, Simonson R, Brockwell-
Staats C, Rubrum A, Wang D, Webb A, Crumpton JC, Lowe J, Gramer M and Webby RJ, 2011. 
Multiple reassortment between pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and endemic influenza viruses in pigs, 
United States. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 17, 1624–1629. doi: 10.3201/eid1709.110338. 
ECDC (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control), 2012a. ECDC Technical Report - 
CNRL in silico exercise to determine the capabilities of network laboratories to detect triple 
reassortant swine origin influenza A(H3N2) viruses. Available online: 
http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/1204-TER-CNRL-Capability-Exercise.pdf 
ECDC (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control), 2012b. ECDC Technical Report - 
Influenza A(H3N2)v laboratory detection questionnaire results. Available online: 
http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/1204-TER-CNRL-Capability-Exercise.pdf 
ECDC (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control), 2012c. Risk Assessment Update – 
Swine-origin triple reassortant influenza A(H3N2) variant viruses in North America 17 August 
2012.Available online:http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/publications/1208-ter-rapid-risk-
assessment-influenza-ah3n2-us.pdf 
EFSA AHAW Panel (EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare), 2010. Scientific opinion on 
African swine fever. EFSA Journal 2010;8(3):1556, 149 pp. doi:10.2903/j.efsa.2010.1556  
EFSA AHAW Panel (EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare), 2013. Scientific Opinion on the 
risk of entry of Aethina tumida and Tropilaelaps spp. in the EU. EFSA Journal 2013;11(3):3128, 
127 pp. doi:10.2903/j.efsa.2013.3128  
EFSA BIOHAZ Panel (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards), 2010. EFSA statement on food safety 
considerations of novel H1N1 influenza virus infections in humans. EFSA Journal 2010;8(6):1629, 
43 pp. doi:10.2903/j.efsa.2010.1629 
Fan X, Zhu H, Zhou B, Smith DK, Chen X, Lam TT-Y, Poon LLM, Peiris M and Guan Y, 2012. 
Emergence and dissemination of a swine H3N2 reassortant influenza virus with 2009 pandemic 
H1N1 genes in pigs in China. Journal of Virology, 86, 2375–2378. 
                                                                                                 Risks posed by the influenza H3N2v 
H3N2v   
EFSA Journal 2013;11(10):3383 54 
Forrest HL and Webster RG, 2010. Perspectives on influenza evolution and the role of research. 
Animal Health Research Reviews, 11(1), 3–18. doi: 10.1017/S1466252310000071 
Garten RJ, Davis CT, Russell CA, Shu B, Lindstrom S, Balish A, Sessions WM, Xu X, Skepner E, 
Deyde V, Okomo-Adhiambo M, Gubareva L, Barnes J, Smith CB, Emery SL, Hillman MJ, 
Rivailler P, Smagala J, de Graaf M, Burke DF, Fouchier RA, Pappas C, Alpuche-Aranda CM, 
López-Gatell H, Olivera H, López I, Myers CA, Faix D, Blair PJ, Yu C, Keene KM, Dotson PD Jr., 
Boxrud D, Sambol AR, Abid SH, St George K, Bannerman T, Moore AL, Stringer DJ, Blevins P, 
Demmler-Harrison GJ, Ginsberg M, Kriner P, Waterman S, Smole S, Guevara HF, Belongia EA, 
Clark PA, Beatrice ST, Donis R, Katz J, Finelli L, Bridges CB, Shaw M, Jernigan DB, Uyeki TM, 
Smith DJ, Klimov AI and Cox NJ, 2009. Antigenic and genetic characteristics of swine-origin 
2009 A (H1N1) influenza viruses circulating in humans. Science, 325, 197–201. 
Gerloff NA, Kremer JR, Charpentier E, Sausy A, Olinger CM, Weicherding P, Schuh J, Van Reeth K 
and Muller CP, 2011. Swine influenza virus antibodies in humans, Western Europe, 2009. 
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 17, 403. 
Graham BS and Crowe JE Jr., 2007. Immunization against viral diseases. In: Field‘s virology, vol. 1, 
5th edn. Eds Knipe DM and Howley PM. Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, Philadelphia, PA, USA, 
487–538. 
Gravenor MB and Kao RR, 2003. Risk assessments on BSE. Veterinary Record, 152, 816.  
Haesebrouck F, Biront P, Pensaert MR and Leunen J, 1985. Epizootics of respiratory tract disease in 
swine in Belgium due to H3N2 influenza virus and experimental reproduction of disease. American 
Journal of Veterinary Research, 46, 1926–1928. 
Heinen PP, van Nieuwstadt AP, de Boer-Luijtze EA and Bianchi AT, 2001. Analysis of the quality of 
protection induced by a porcine influenza A vaccine to challenge with an H3N2 virus. Veterinary 
Immunology and Immunopathology, 82, 39–56. 
Heim D, Gardner I, Mumford E and Kihm U. 2006. Risk assessment and surveillance for bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy. Revue scientifique et technique, 25, 937–950.  
Hoffmann B, Harder T, Lange E, Kalthoff D, Reimann I, Grund C, Oehme R, Vahlenkamp TW and 
Beer M, 2010. New real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reactions facilitate detection 
and differentiation of novel A/H1N1 influenza virus in porcine and human samples. Berliner und 
Münchener tierärztliche Wochenschrift, 123, 286–292. 
Hoinville, L.J., Alban, L., Drewe, J.A., Gibbens, J.C., Gustafson, L., Häsler, B., Saegerman, C., 
Salman, M., Stärk, K.D.C., 2013. Proposed terms and concepts for describing and evaluating 
animal-health surveillance systems. Preventive Veterinary Medicine 112, 1–12. 
Houser KV, Katz JM and Tumpey TM, 2013. Seasonal trivalent inactivated influenza vaccine does not 
protect against newly emerging variants of influenza A (H3N2v) virus in ferrets. Journal of 
Virology, 87, 1261–1263. 
Howard WA, Essen SC, Strugnell BW, Russell C, Barrass L, Reid SM and Brown IH, 2011. 
Reassortant pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus in pigs, United Kingdom. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 
17, 1049–1052. 
Khatri M, Dwivedi V, Krakowka S, Manickam C, Ali A, Wang L, Qin Z, Renukaradhya GJ and Lee 
CW, 2010. Swine influenza H1N1 virus induces acute inflammatory immune responses in pig 
lungs: a potential animal model for human H1N1 influenza virus. Journal of Virology, 84, 11210–
11218. 
Kimble JB, Sorrell E, Shao H, Martin PL and Perez DR, 2011. Compatibility of H9N2 avian influenza 
surface genes and 2009 pandemic H1N1 internal genes for transmission in the ferret model. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 108, 12084. 
                                                                                                 Risks posed by the influenza H3N2v 
H3N2v   
EFSA Journal 2013;11(10):3383 55 
Kitikoon P, Nilubol D, Erickson BJ, Janke BH, Hoover TC, Sornsen SA and Thacker EL, 2006. The 
immune response and maternal antibody interference to a heterologous H1N1 swine influenza virus 
infection following vaccination. Veterinary Immunology and Immunopathology, 112, 117–128. 
Kitikoon P, Vincent AL, Jones KR, Nilubol D, Yu S, Janke BH, Thacker BJ and Thacker EL, 2009. 
Vaccine efficacy and immune response to swine influenza virus challenge in pigs infected with 
porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus at the time of SIV vaccination. Veterinary 
Microbiology, 139, 235–244. 
Kitikoon P, Vincent AL, Gauger PC, Schlink SN, Bayles DO, Gramer MR, Darnell D, Webby RJ, 
Lager KM and Swenson SL, 2012. Pathogenicity and transmission in pigs of the novel A (H3N2) v 
influenza virus isolated from humans and characterization of swine H3N2 viruses isolated in 2010–
2011. Journal of Virology, 86, 6804–6814. 
Kobasa D, Kodihalli S, Luo M, Castrucci MR, Donatelli I, Suzuki Y, Suzuki T and Kawaoka Y, 1999. 
Amino acid residues contributing to the substrate specificity of the influenza A virus 
neuraminidase. Journal of Virology, 73, 6743–6751. 
Krueger WS and Gray GC, 2013. Swine influenza virus infections in man. In: Swine influenza, current 
topics in microbiology and immunology. Eds Richt JA and Webby RJ. Springer, Berlin Germany, 
201–225. 
Kuntz-Simon G and Madec F, 2009. Genetic and antigenic evolution of swine influenza viruses in 
Europe and evaluation of their zoonotic potential. Zoonoses Public Health, 56, 310–325. doi: 
10.1111/j.1863-2378.2009.01236.x. 
Kyriakis CS, Brown IH, Foni E, Kuntz-Simon G, Maldonado J, Madec F, Essen SC, Chiapponi C and 
Van Reeth K, 2011. Virological surveillance and preliminary antigenic characterization of 
influenza viruses in pigs in five European countries from 2006 to 2008. Zoonoses Public Health, 
58, 93–101. doi: 10.1111/j.1863-2378.2009.01301.x. 
Kyriakis CS, Rose N, Foni E, Maldonado J, Loeffen WL, Madec F, Simon G and Van Reeth K, 2013 
Influenza A virus infection dynamics in swine farms in Belgium, France, Italy and Spain, 2006–
2008. Veterinary Microbiology, 162, 543–550.  
Lakdawala SS, Lamirande EW, Suguitan AL, Wang W, Santos CP, Vogel L, Matsuoka Y, Lindsley 
WG, Jin H and Subbarao K, 2011. Eurasian-origin gene segments contribute to the transmissibility, 
aerosol release, and morphology of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza virus. PLoS Pathogens, 7, 
e1002443. 
Larsen DL, Karasin A and Olsen CW, 2001. Immunization of pigs against influenza virus infection by 
DNA vaccine priming followed by killed-virus vaccine boosting. Vaccine, 19, 2842–2853. 
Lee JH, Gramer MR and Joo HS, 2007. Efficacy of swine influenza A virus vaccines against an H3N2 
virus variant. Canadian Journal of Veterinary Research, 71, 207–212. 
Lina B, Bouscambert M, Enouf V, Rousset D, Valette M and van der Werf S, 2011. S-OtrH3N2 
viruses: Use of sequence data for description of the molecular characteristics of the viruses and 
their relatedness to previously circulating H3N2 human viruses. Euro Surveillance, 16, 50. 
Lindstrom S, Garten R, Balish A, Shu B, Emery S, Berman L, Barnes N, Sleeman K, Gubareva L, 
Villanueva J and Klimov A, 2011. Human infections with novel reassortant influenza A(H3N2)v 
viruses, United States, 2011. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 18, 834–837. doi: 
10.3201/eid1805.111922. 
Liu Q, Ma J, Liu H, Qi W, Anderson J, Henry S, Hesse R, Richt J and Ma W, 2012a. Emergence of 
novel reassortant H3N2 swine influenza viruses with the 2009 pandemic H1N1 genes in the United 
States. Archives of Virology, 157, 555–562. 
Liu Q, Qiao C, Marjuki H, Bawa B, Ma J, Guillossou S, Webby RJ, Richt JA and Ma W, 2012b. 
Combination of PB2 271A and SR polymorphism at positions 590/591 is critical for viral 
                                                                                                 Risks posed by the influenza H3N2v 
H3N2v   
EFSA Journal 2013;11(10):3383 56 
replication and virulence of swine influenza virus in cultured cells and in vivo. Journal of Virology, 
86, 1233–1237. 
Loving CL, Lager KM, Vincent AL, Brockmeier SL, Gauger PC, Anderson TK, Kitikoon P, Perez DR 
and Kehrli ME Jr., 2013. Efficacy of inactivated and live-attenuated influenza virus vaccines in 
pigs against infection and transmission of emerging H3N2 similar to the 2011–2012 H3N2v. 
Journal of Virology, 2013 Jul 3 [Epub ahead of print]. 
Ma W, Lager KM, Vincent AL, Janke BH, Gramer MR and Richt, JA, 2009. The role of swine in the 
generation of novel influenza viruses. Zoonoses Public Health, 56, 326–337. 
Macklin MD, McCabe D, McGregor MW, Neumann V, Meyer T, Callan R, Hinshaw VS and Swain 
WF, 1998. Immunization of pigs with a particle-mediated DNA vaccine to influenza A virus 
protects against challenge with homologous virus. Journal of Virology, 72, 1491–1496. 
Matrosovich M, Gambaryan A, Teneberg S, Piskarev V, Yamnikova S, Lvov D, Robertson J nd 
Karlsson KA, 1997. Avian influenza A viruses differ from human viruses by recognition of 
sialyloligosaccharides and gangliosides and by a higher conservation of the HA receptor-binding 
Site. Virology, 233, 224–234. 
Matrosovich M, Tuzikov A, Bovin N, Gambaryan A, Klimov A, Castrucci MR, Donatelli I and 
Kawaoka, Y, 2000. Early alterations of the receptor-binding properties of H1, H2, and H3 avian 
influenza virus hemagglutinins after their introduction into mammals. Journal of Virology, 74, 
8502–8512. 
Moncorgé O, Mura M and Barclay WS. 2010. Evidence for avian and human host cell factors that 
affect the activity of influenza virus polymerase. Journal of Virology, 84, 9978–9986. 
Moreno A, Di Trani L, Faccini S, Vaccari G, Nigrelli D, Boniotti MB, Falcone E, Boni A, Chiapponi 
C, Sozzi E and Cordioli P, 2011. Novel H1N2 swine influenza reassortant strain in pigs derived 
from the pandemic H1N1/2009 virus. Veterinary Microbiology, 149, 472–477. 
Munch M, Nielsen LP, Handberg KJ and Jørgensen PH, 2001. Detection and subtyping (H5 and H7) 
of avian type A influenza virus by reverse transcription-PCR and PCR-ELISA. Archives of 
Virology, 146, 87–97. 
Myers KP, Olsen CW, Setterquist SF, Capuano AW, Donham KJ, Thacker EL, Merchant JA and 
Gray, GC. 2006. Are swine workers in the United States at increased risk of infection with zoonotic 
influenza virus? Clinical Infectious Diseases, 42, 14–20. 
Myers KP, Olsen CW and Gray GC. 2007. Cases of swine influenza in humans: a review of the 
literature. Clinical Infectious Diseases, 44, 1084–1088. 
Nelson MI, Gramer MR, Vincent AL and Holmes EC, 2012a. Global transmission of influenza viruses 
from humans to swine. Journal of General Virology. 93, 2195–2203. 
Nelson M, Detmer SE, Wentworth DE, Tan Y, Schwartzbard A, Halpin RA, Stockwell T, Lin X, 
Vincent A and Gramer MR, 2012b. Genomic reassortment of influenza A virus in North American 
swine, 1998–2011 Journal of General Virology, 93, 2584–2589.  
Neumann G and Kawaoka Y, 2006. Host range restriction and pathogenicity in the context of 
influenza pandemic. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 12, 881–886. 
Neumann G, Noda T and Kawaoka Y. 2009. Emergence and pandemic potential of swine-origin 
H1N1 influenza virus. Nature, 459, 931–939. doi: 10.1038/nature08157. 
Olsen CW, Brammer L, Easterday BC, Arden N, Belay E, Baker I and Cox NJ. 2002. Serologic 
evidence of H1 swine influenza virus infection in swine farm residents and employees. Emerging 
Infectious Diseases, 8, 814. 
Olsen CW, Karasin A and Erickson G, 2003. Characterization of a swine-like reassortant H1N2 
Influenza virus isolated from a wild duck in the United States. Virus Research, 93, 115–121. 
                                                                                                 Risks posed by the influenza H3N2v 
H3N2v   
EFSA Journal 2013;11(10):3383 57 
Olsen C, Brown I, Easterday B and Van Reeth K, 2006. Swine influenza. In: Diseases of swine. Eds 
Zimmerman J, Karriker L, Ramirez A, Kent Schwartz and Stevenson G. John Wiley & Sons, 
AASV,USA 469–482. 
Pascua, P.N.Q., Lim, G.-J., Kwon, H., Park, S.-J., Kim, E.-H., Song, M.-S., Kim, C.J., Choi, Y.-K., 
2013. Emergence of H3N2pM-like and novel reassortant H3N1 swine viruses possessing segments 
derived from the A (H1N1)pdm09 influenza virus, Korea. Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses 
n/a–n/a. Published online August 30. 
Pearce MB, Jayaraman A, Pappas C, Belser JA, Zeng H, Gustin KM, Maines TR, Sun X, Raman R, 
Cox NJ, Sasisekharan R, Katz JM and Tumpey TM, 2012. Pathogenesis and transmission of swine 
origin A(H3N2)v influenza viruses in ferrets. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of 
the USA,109, 3944–3949. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1119945109.  
Pol F, Quéguiner S, Gorin S, Deblanc C and Simon G, 2011. Validation of commercial real-time RT-
PCR kits for detection of influenza A viruses in porcine samples and differentiation of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus in pigs. Journal of Virological Methods, 171, 241–247. doi: 
10.1016/j.jviromet.2010.11.007.  
Reperant LA, Kuiken T and Osterhaus AD, 2012. Adaptive pathways of zoonotic influenza viruses: 
from exposure to establishment in humans. Vaccine, 30, 4419–4434. 
Richt JA, Lager KM, Janke BH, Woods RD, Webster RG and Webby RJ, 2003. Pathogenic and 
antigenic properties of phylogenetically distinct reassortant H3N2 swine influenza viruses 
cocirculating in the United States. Journal of Clinical Microbiology, 41, 3198–3205. 
Romagosa A, Allerson M, Gramer M, Joo HS, Deen J, Detmer S and Torremorell M, 2011. 
Vaccination of influenza a virus decreases transmission rates in pigs. Veterinary Research, 42, 120. 
Skowronski DM, Janjua NZ, De Serres G, Purych D, Gilca V, Scheifele DW, Dionne M, Sabaiduc S, 
Gardy JL, Li G, Bastien N, Petric M, Boivin G and Li Y, 2012. Cross-reactive and vaccine-induced 
antibody to an emerging swine-origin variant of influenza A virus subtype H3N2 (H3N2v). Journal 
of Infectious Diseases, 206, 1852–1861. doi: 10.1093/infdis/jis500.  
Slomka MJ, Densham AL, Coward VJ, Essen S, Brookes SM, Irvine RM, Spackman E, Ridgeon J, 
Gardner R, Hanna A, Suarez DL and Brown IH. 2010. Real time reverse transcription (RRT)-
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) methods for detection of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus 
and European swine influenza A virus infections in pigs. Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses, 
4, 277–293. doi: 10.1111/j.1750-2659.2010.00149.x. 
Smith G, Bahl J, Vijaykrishna D, Zhang J, Poon LLM, Chen H, Webster RG, Peiris JSM and Guan, Y, 
2009. Dating the emergence of pandemic influenza viruses. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences of the USA 106, 11709–11712. 
Starick E, Lange E, Fereidouni S, Bunzenthal C, Höveler R, Kuczka A, Grosse Beilage E, Hamann, H-
P, Klingelhöfer I, Steinhauer D, Vahlenkamp T, Beer M and Harder T, 2011. Reassorted pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 influenza A virus discovered from pigs in Germany. Journal of General Virology, 92, 
1184–1188. 
Starick E, Lange E, Grund C, Grosse Beilage E, Döhring S, Maas A, Noé T, Beer M and Harder TC. 
2012. Reassortants of pandemic influenza A virus H1N1/2009 and endemic porcine HxN2 viruses 
emerge in swine populations in Germany. Journal of General Virology, 93, 1658–1663. 
Tremblay D, Allard V, Doyon J, Bellehumeur C, Spearman JG, Harel J and Gagnon CA, 2011. 
Emergence of a New Swine H3N2 and Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza A virus reassortant in 
two Canadian animal populations, mink and swine. Journal of Clinical Microbiology, 49, 4386–
4390. 
USDA (United States Department of Agriculture). Online. Swine Influenza Surveillance Update. 
Available online: 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_dis_spec/swine/siv_surveillance.shtml  
                                                                                                 Risks posed by the influenza H3N2v 
H3N2v   
EFSA Journal 2013;11(10):3383 58 
Van Reeth K and Ma W, 2012. Swine influenza virus vaccines: to change or not to change—that‘s the 
question. Current Topics in Microbiology And immunology, 370, 173–200.  
Van Reeth K, Brown IH, Dürrwald R, Foni E, Labarque G, Lenihan P, Maldonado J, Markowska-
Daniel I, Pensaert M, Pospisil Z and Koch G, 2008. Seroprevalence of H1N1, H3N2 and H1N2 
influenza viruses in pigs in seven European countries in 2002–2003. Influenza and Other 
Respiratory Viruses, 2, 99≠105.  
Van Reeth K, Gregory V, Hay A and Pensaert M, 2003. Protection against a European H1N2 swine 
influenza virus in pigs previously infected with H1N1 and/or H3N2 subtypes. Vaccine, 21, 1375–
1381. 
Van Reeth K, Labarque G and Pensaert M, 2006. Serological profiles after consecutive experimental 
infections of pigs with European H1N1, H3N2, and H1N2 swine influenza viruses. Viral 
Immunology, 19, 373–82. Erratum in Viral Immunology, 19, 775. 
Van Reeth K, Nauwynck H and Pensaert M. 1996. Dual infections of feeder pigs with porcine 
reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus followed by porcine respiratory coronavirus or swine 
influenza virus: a clinical and virological study. Veterinary Microbiology, 48, 325–335. 
Van Reeth K, 2007. Avian and swine influenza viruses: our current understanding of the zoonotic risk. 
Veterinary Research, 38, 243–260. 
Vijaykrishna D, Poon LLM, Zhu HC, Ma SK, Li OTW, Cheung CL, Smith GJD, Peiris JSM and Guan 
Y, 2010. Reassortment of pandemic H1N1/2009 influenza a virus in swine. Science. 328, 1529. 
Vincent AL, Lager KM, Harland M, Loursso A, Zanella E, Zanella-Ciacci JR, Kehrli Jr. ME and 
Klimov A, 2009. Absence of 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza A virus in fresh pork. PloS One 
4(12), e8367. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0008367. 
Waalen K, Kilander A, Dudman SG, Ramos-Ocao R and Hungnes O, 2012. Age-dependant 
prevalence of antibodies cross-reactive to the influenza A (H3N2) variant virus in sera collected in 
Norway in 2011. Euro Surveillance, 17 (19), 10 May 2012. 
WHO (World Health Organisation), 2005. International Health Regulations of 2005. Available online.  
http://www.who.int/ihr/9789241596664/en/ 
Wieland B, Dhollander S, Salman M and Koenen F, 2011. Qualitative risk assessment in a data-scarce 
environment: a model to assess the impact of control measures on spread of African swine fever. 
Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 99, 4–14. doi: 10.1016/j.prevetmed.2011.01.001 
Yassine HM, Al-Natour MQ, Lee C and Saif YM, 2007. Interspecies and intraspecies transmission of 
triple reassortant H3N2 influenza A viruses. Virology Journal, 4, 129. 
Yassine HM, Lee CW, Gourapura R and Saif YM, 2010. Interspecies and intraspecies transmission of 
influenza A viruses: viral, host and environmental factors. Animal Health Research Reviews, 11, 
53–72. doi: 10.1017/S1466252310000137. 
Zamarin D, Ortigoza MB and Palese P, 2006. Influenza A virus PB1-F2 protein contributes to viral 
pathogenesis in mice. Journal of Virology, 80, 7976–7983. 
Zepeda-Sein C, 1998. Methodes d'evaluation des risques zoosanitaires lors des echanges 
internationaux. OIE seminaire sur la securite zoosanitaires des echanges dans les Caraibes, 2–17. 
Zhou NN, Senne DA, Landgraf JS, Swenson SL, Erickson G, Rossow K, Liu L, Yoon K, Krauss S and 
Webster RG, 1999. Genetic reassortment of avian, swine, and human influenza A viruses in 
American pigs. Journal of Virology, 73, 8851–8856.  
                                                                                                 Risks posed by the influenza H3N2v 
H3N2v   
EFSA Journal 2013;11(10):3383 59 
APPENDIX A: COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE VACCINES IN THE USA 
Table 16:  Overview of the major licensed SIV vaccines in the USA in 2011 
Manufacturer Product name Influenza virus 
strains
(c) 
Adjuvant
(d)
 
Novartis PneumoStar
(a)
 
SIV 
α-cluster H1N1 
cluster I H3N2 
Immunstar  
Intervet/Schering-
Plough Animal 
Health 
MaxiVac Excell
(b)
 
3.0 
α-cluster H1N1 
β-cluster rH1N1 
cluster I H3N2 
Emunade  
Intervet/Schering-
Plough Animal 
Health 
MaxiVac Excell 5.0 β-cluster H1N1 
γ-cluster H1N1 
δ-cluster H1N1 
cluster I H3N2 
cluster IV H3N2 
Emunade  
Zoetis FluSure Legacy α-cluster H1N1 
cluster I H3N2 
Amphigen  
Zoetis FluSure XP γ-cluster H1N1 
δ-cluster H1N1 
cluster IV H3N2 
Amphigen  
Zoetis FluSure Pandemic A(H1N1)pdm09 Amphigen  
Zoetis FluSure XP γ-cluster H1N1 
δ2-cluster H1N1 
cluster IV H3N2 
δ1-cluster H1N2 
Amphigen  
(a): Pneumostar is the only single-dose SIV vaccine. 
(b): MaxiVac Excell is a registered trademark of Intervet/Schering-Plough Animal Health. 
(c): Exact strain names and antigen dose are proprietary for most vaccines. 
(d): All adjuvants are oil-in-water emulsions, except for Immunstar , which is water-in-oil-in-water. 
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APPENDIX B: ESTIMATES OF LIKELIHOODS OF EVENTS 
Table 17:  Estimates of likelihoods of events based on expert opinion, factors to be considered, and their rationale 
Question 
no 
Risk/events What is the likelihood that…? Facts to be considered Assessment  Reason  Uncertainty Reference in opinion 
Presence of H3N2v in a human travelling from the USA to the EU 
Presence of H3N2v in a ―non-professional‖ in the pig sector who travels from the USA to the EU 
1a Contact with 
infectious pigs 
… out of all ―non-professional‖ persons, 
one will come in contact with an 
infectious pig in US? 
Prevalence in pigs, contact 
frequency 
L Contact is expected to be 
occasional, for instance visiting a 
fair once and by chance 
M Section 5.2. Transmission 
from pigs to humans 
1b Gets infected ... this person will get infected? Immunity of person, contact type 
and intensity, infectious doses 
L Immunity is considered the same 
for human populations. Low 
intensity of contact 
M Section 5.2. Transmission 
from pigs to humans 
1c Travels and 
remains 
infectious 
... this person will travel from the USA 
to the EU and remains infectious until a 
possible visit to a farm? 
Infectious period, duration of 
journey 
N There are many people travelling 
but there is a short infectious period 
and it is very unlikely that this 
person will travel tot he  EU within 
a few days 
L Section 3.2. Clinical signs 
in humans 
Presence of H3N2v in a ―professional‖ in the pig production sector who travels from the USA to the EU (including people usually attending pig fairs and family members of pig producers, if they come in contact with 
pigs) 
1d Contact with 
infectious pigs 
.. a ―professional‖ will come in contact 
with an infectious pig in the USA? 
Prevalence in pigs, contact 
frequency 
M It is very likely that there is a direct 
intense contact; however, the 
prevalence is unknown and may 
change 
H Section 5.2. Transmission 
from pigs to humans 
1e Gets infectious ...this person will get infected? Immunity of person, contact type 
and intensity, infectious doses 
M Immunity is considered the same 
for human populations. Medium 
intensity of contact 
M Section 5.2. Transmission 
from pigs to humans 
1f Travels while 
infectious 
... this person will travel from the USA 
to the EU and remains infectious until a 
possible visit to a farm? 
Infectious period, duration of 
journey 
L May be more likely than 1c as EU 
―professionals‖ who visit the USA 
may return to the EU a short time 
after being in contact with the 
infectious pigs 
M Section 3.2. Clinical signs 
in humans 
Presence of H3N2pM in 1 breeding pig to be exported 
2   ... a breeding pig infected with H3N2pM 
is exported from the USA to the EU? 
Prevalence in breeding pigs to be 
exported, type of surveillance 
(active/passive), prevention and 
control (vaccination) 
L According to the data provided 
from US surveillance there is a low 
percentage  of positive H3N2pM 
samples  
H Section 3.1.3. Surveillance 
in swine in the USA 
Detection of H3N2pM pig at farm level (US) and response  
3a Clinical signs … the breeding pig for export, infected 
with H3N2pM, has clinical signs?  
Age, infectious dose, viral load, 
immune status, infection pressure, 
etc. 
L It is known that the majority of the 
cases are asymptomatic  
L Section 4.1. Pathogenesis 
of swine influenza in 
general 
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Question 
no 
Risk/events What is the likelihood that…? Facts to be considered Assessment  Reason  Uncertainty Reference in opinion 
3b Identification of 
animal by vet 
… the infected breeding pig with clinical 
signs is identified at the farm level of the 
exporting country? 
Awareness of farmer and 
veterinarian at the farm level 
H   L No references 
3c Effective 
measures 
… the identified infected breeding pig 
will not be allowed to be exported?  
Biosecurity measures in place, 
contingency plan 
H   L No references 
Detection and response at BIP (Boarder Inspection Post) at the Importing country 
4a Clinical signs … an imported breeding pig, infected 
with H3N2pM, has clinical signs? 
Age, infectious doses, viral load, 
immune status, infection pressure, 
etc. 
L The majority of the cases are 
asymptomatic  
L 4.1. Pathogenesis of swine 
influenza in general 
4b Identification of 
animal by vet 
… the infected breeding pig with clinical 
signs, it is identified at the BIP of the 
Importing country? 
Awareness of Inspector at the BIP H   L No references 
4c Sample sent to 
lab (H3N2pM) 
… from that pig with clinical signs, a 
sample is properly taken and sent to a 
lab? 
Sampling protocols, laboratory 
capacity  
L BIPs that are approved for 
ungulates should have facilities to 
house a consignment in case it 
needs to be detained and have 
possibilities for further examination 
and testing. However, currently, no 
sampling is done for H3N2pM 
L No references 
4d Positive result … a positive result is obtained from a 
sample taken from that identified 
infected breeding pig? 
Test characteristics  L BIPs that are approved for 
ungulates should have facilities to 
house a consignment in case it 
needs to be detained and have 
possibilities for further examination 
and testing. However, currently, no 
sampling is done for H3N2pM 
L No references 
4e Effective 
measures 
… the identified infected breeding pig 
will not be allowed to move to farm?  
Legislation on imports L BIPs that are approved for 
ungulates should have facilities to 
house a consignment in case it 
needs to be detained and have 
possibilities for further examination 
and testing. However, currently, no 
sampling is done for H3N2pM 
L No references 
Imported pigs with a separation period at the first holding of 30 days before joining the other animals of the first holding—scenario 1 
5 Pig remains 
infectious after 
separation 
period  
… the influenza strain from the infected 
imported pigs is not cleared when the 
imported animals are initially separated 
before joining the holding at the first 
holding (duration of separation is 30 
days)? 
Biosecurity measures in place for 
pig diseases 
N Farmer decides to separate imported 
pigs by applying high biosecurity 
measures, ensuring that the 
imported pigs are always 
maintained in separation without 
direct or indirect contact with other 
animals, preventing the 
transmission of diseases. The 
infection will be cleared from the 
H No references 
                                                                                                                                  Risks posed by the influenza H3N2v H3N2v  
 
EFSA Journal 2013;11(10):3383 62 
Question 
no 
Risk/events What is the likelihood that…? Facts to be considered Assessment  Reason  Uncertainty Reference in opinion 
imported breeding pigs hat were set 
apart 
First pig holding exposed to H3N2v by humans  
6a Non-
professionals in 
contact with 
pigs 
… a non-professional travelling from the 
USA immediately comes in contact with 
the pigs in the first farm? 
Biosecurity measures in place, 
contact pattern 
L As per 1c H No references 
6b Professionals in 
contact with 
pigs 
… a human travelling from US gets 
immediately in contact with the pigs in 
the 1st farm? 
Biosecurity measures in place, 
contact pattern 
L Awareness in biosecurity and good 
farm practice 
H No references 
Effective immune response to infection 
7 Effective 
immune 
response to 
infection 
… that non-infected pigs that are 
exposed to H3N2pM have enough 
immunity to avoid the infection? 
Known preimmune status of the EU 
pig population, herd immunity, 
cross-immunity with other SIV 
virus including H3N2 or vaccine 
virus, 
L There is a big variation in the 
prevalence of EU H3N2 SIV (can 
vary from none to low). In some 
MS it is not circulating. Vaccination 
status is also very variable. Previous 
contact with H3N2 combined with 
vaccination gives the best possible 
protection. 
The naivety and immunity situation 
may vary among European 
countries 
M Chapter 6, Table 1: 
Overview of swine 
influenza viruses subtyped 
in 13 European countries 
from November 2010 to 
October 2012  
Detection of first infected holding and response during (residency period at the holding of destination—pigs must be conveyed without delay to the holding of destination where they shall remain for a minimum period 
of 30 days before further movement outside the holding) 
8a Clinical signs … that one breeding pig infected with 
H3N2pM has clinical signs in the 1st 
farm? 
Virulence of H3N2pM L The majority of the cases are 
asymptomatic  
L  4.1. Pathogenesis of swine 
influenza in general 
8b Identification of 
animal by vet 
... that the infected breeding pig with 
clinical signs, it is identified in the 1st 
farm? 
Awareness of vet at the farm and 
farmer ,  
H Farmer is aware of clinical signs 
and may call the vet 
M No references  
8c Sample sent to 
lab (H3N2pM) 
… that from that pig with clinical signs, 
a sample is properly taken and sent to a 
lab? 
Sampling protocols, laboratory 
capacity,  
M Vet takes samples M No references  
8d Positive result …that a H3N2pM-positive result is 
obtained from a sample taken from that 
identified infected breeding pig? 
Test characteristics  L Influenza A is screened initially, no 
further typification 
M No references  
8e Effective 
measures 
…that the identified infected breeding 
pig will not be allowed to further spread 
the strain?  
Biosecurity measures in place, 
contingency plan 
L Animals may spread the virus to 
other farm 
M No references  
Infected pigs move to 2nd holding  
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Question 
no 
Risk/events What is the likelihood that…? Facts to be considered Assessment  Reason  Uncertainty Reference in opinion 
9  Infected pigs 
move to  second 
holding  
 
... that a second farm is exposed to a pig 
that has been infected in the first farm? 
Biosecurity measures in place, 
movement pattern, residency period 
in place in the first farm 
H  
 
The second farm may have any 
level of biosecurity implemented  
A lot of animal movement is 
assumed 
L No references  
Effective immune response to infection 
10  Effective 
immune 
response to 
infection 
… that non-infected pigs of the second 
farm, that are exposed to H3N2pM, have 
enough immunity to avoid the infection? 
Known pre-immune status of the 
EU pig population, herd immunity, 
cross-immunity with other SIVs 
including H3N2 or vaccine virus  
L There is a big variation in the 
prevalence of EU H3N2 SIV (can 
vary from none to low). In some 
MS it is not circulating. Vaccination 
status is also very variable. Previous 
contact with H3N2 combined with 
vaccination gives the best possible 
protection. 
L Chapter 6, Table 1: 
Overview of swine 
influenza viruses subtyped 
in 13 European countries 
from November 2010 to 
October 2012  
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GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS 
BAL Bronchoalveolar lavage fluid 
Genetic 
constellation 
Set/combination/constitution of genes and/or mutations and the interaction between 
these components  
H3N2pM Represents the US swine TR H3N2 virus which has reassorted with the pandemic 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus from which only the M gene has been acquired. It represents 
one of the rH3N2p genotypes isolated from swine. The H3N2pM isolates carry seven 
genes from TR H3N2 and only the M gene from A(H1N1)pdm09 
H3N2v Represents this porcine H3N2pM virus strain once it has been transmitted from pigs to 
humans and has been isolated from infected humans. The gene constellation of A 
H3N2v is thus considered as being the same as H3N2pM 
HA Influenza A RNA segment that encodes haemagglutinin 
M  Influenza A RNA segment that encodes two matrix proteins (M1 and M2) 
NA Influenza A RNA segment that encodes neuraminidase 
NP Influenza A RNA segment that encodes nucleoprotein 
NS Influenza A RNA segment that encodes two distinct structural proteins (NS1 and NEP) 
PA Influenza A RNA segment that encodes an RNA polymerase acidic 
PB1 Influenza A RNA segment that encodes an RNA polymerase basic 1 and PB1-F2 
protein  
PB2 Influenza A RNA segment that encodes an RNA polymerase basic 2  
rH3N2p Represents all strains isolated from swine and characterized by a genetic constellation 
derived from the enzootic US swine TR H3N2 genetic reassortment events with A 
(H1N1)pdm09 (the number of A(H1N1)pdm09 genes contained in these isolates varies 
according to the genotype). This group includes H3N2pM isolates 
SIV Swine influenza virus 
TRIG Triple reassortant internal gene (cassette). This acronym stands for the internal set of 
genes (PA, PB1, PB2, NP, NS and M) derived from the original TR H3N2 viruses. 
This genetic constellation is found combined with various HAs and NAs, forming TR 
H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 lineages currently circulating in the pig population in the 
USA  
Triple 
reassortant 
(TR) H3N2  
Swine influenza viruses originated around 1998 in the USA as a result of reassortment 
between avian, human and swine influenza viruses. These strains carry the following 
gene combination: human HA, NA and PB1; swine NS, NP, and M; and avian PB2 
and PA 
 
 
